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TAXING THE VICTIMS: COMPENSATORY 
DAMAGE AWARDS AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAWSUITS 
Marisa J. Mead* 
INTRODUCTION 
The prospect of recovering damages in sexual harassment 
lawsuits should be encouraging to potential claimants.1 Prior to 
1996, the federal income tax code furthered this goal by allowing 
victims winning or settling lawsuits based on non-physical 
personal injuries to exclude compensatory damage awards from 
                                                          
 *Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., University of Delaware, 
2001. The author wishes to thank her parents and sister for their constant love 
and support. A special thanks to Scott M. Steel for always believing in me. 
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003). Plaintiffs may sue and recover damages 
for sexual harassment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(the 1964 Act). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (prohibiting sex discrimination in 
employment); see also infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing 
the application of the Civil Rights Acts to sexual harassment law); infra Part 
I.B (noting the types of damages that victims may recover in sexual 
harassment lawsuits). Both men and women are presently entitled to sue for 
sexual harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The number of women who are 
affected by and prosecute for sexual harassment, however, is substantially 
greater than the number of men. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 
1992-FY 2002, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2003). In 2001, women filed 86.3% of sexual harassment charges filed with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. Because sexual 
harassment law is predominantly targeted toward the concerns of women, this 
note specifically focuses on how women are influenced by the interaction 
between sexual harassment law and federal tax policy. 
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their gross income.2 In 1996, however, Congress added a 
provision to the Small Business Job Protection Act3 making all 
punitive and compensatory damages awarded for non-physical 
injuries taxable income.4 Therefore, federal income tax may 
significantly reduce or completely dissolve damages awarded to 
non-physical injury victims.5 In extreme cases, these plaintiffs 
may owe the government more money than they were originally 
awarded to compensate for their injuries.6 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs who receive compensatory damages 
on account of physical personal injuries are not taxed on their 
damage awards.7 Section 104(a) of the United States tax code 
provides that victims receiving damages for non-physical injuries, 
                                                          
2 See Kristin Loiacono, Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way and Means, 
TRIAL, Sept. 1, 2000, at 11 (reporting on the tax treatment of damage awards 
received for physical and non-physical injuries). Section 61(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code defines gross income as “all income from whatever source 
derived.” 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2003). Section 104(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code provided an exception to this for income derived from personal injury 
damage awards received in settlements or lawsuits. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) 
(1995). Prior to 1996, § 104(a) did not distinguish between types of personal 
injuries but, rather, excluded damages from any type of personal injury or 
sickness. Id. 
3 Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1775 (1996). 
4 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003). See Loiacono, supra note 2, for discussion 
of the implications of this provision. 
5 Loiacono, supra note 2. 
6 See Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, at A18 (discussing the case of Cynthia C. Spina, 
who won her sex discrimination case but was required to pay taxes in excess 
of her damage award); infra Part III.B (illustrating the specifics of Ms. Spina’s 
case). The tax consequences vary among plaintiffs, depending on a number of 
factors such as the plaintiff’s gross income before the damage award, the 
amount the plaintiff may be claiming as income tax deductions and the amount 
of damages awarded to the plaintiff in the lawsuit. See infra Parts II.D and 
III.B (discussing the different factors that determine the tax consequences for 
different plaintiffs). 
7 § 104(a)(2). This is because the Internal Revenue Code still allows 
victims of physical personal injuries to exclude their damage awards from the 
calculation of gross income. Id.; see also Loiacono, supra note 2 (noting that 
victims of personal physical injuries are treated preferentially, as opposed to 
victims of non-physical injuries by the tax code). § 104(a)(2). 
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including sexual harassment, must always pay income tax on 
their awards while claimants recovering compensatory damages 
for physical injuries are not required to do so.8 Because § 104(a) 
creates expensive tax consequences for plaintiffs receiving 
damage awards in non-physical injury cases,9 many sexual 
harassment victims are being deterred from commencing lawsuits 
against their employers.10 
This note argues that the unreasonable distinction between 
damages flowing from physical personal injuries and those from 
non-physical personal injuries is not simply a monetary burden—
it also hinders the progress the United States has made in 
recognizing sexual harassment as a serious problem.11 Part I of 
this note provides background information about the development 
of sexual harassment law and how sexual harassment became a 
compensable injury as a form of employment discrimination. Part 
II explains the history and current status of the taxation of 
damage awards in the United States pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 
104(a). Part III examines the economical, social and legal 
consequences of § 104(a)’s system of “taxing the victims.” 
                                                          
8 § 104(a)(2). All damages relating to physical injuries, except for 
punitive damages, are exempt from income taxation, while all damages 
relating to non-physical injuries, both compensatory and punitive, are not 
exempt from taxation. Id.; see Marcia Coyle, Bill to Remove Tax on Awards 
May See Action, 228 N.Y. L.J. 33 (2002) (arguing that the tax treatment of 
physical and non-physical injuries is a distinction without reason). 
9 Loiacono, supra note 2. See also Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, 
Discrimination Against Damages for Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme 
Court, Congress, and the Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447 (1998) 
(criticizing the distinction between lost wages in physical injury cases and back 
pay awarded in employment discrimination cases). 
10 See Liptak, supra note 6 (reporting that there is less of an incentive to 
commence a lawsuit based on employment discrimination because of the tax 
burdens created by § 104(a)). Section 104(a) applies to all non-physical 
injuries and, thus, to all forms of employment discrimination. § 104(a)(2). 
This note focuses on sexual harassment claims to provide a specific example 
of the effect current tax policy has on a particular area of anti-discrimination 
law. 
11 See infra Part I.A (discussing the development of the law in 
recognizing sexual harassment as a compensable injury). 
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Specifically, the tax code deters victims of sexual harassment 
from reporting their claims, insinuates that their injuries are not 
“real” and creates a contradictory legal policy.12 Finally, Part IV 
discusses conceivable future improvements to the tax code that 
would correct the negative effects of this tax policy. 
I. BACKGROUND OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
The significance of taxing non-physical injury damage awards 
in sexual harassment lawsuits is best appreciated by 
understanding the foundations of sexual harassment law.13 Today, 
through the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,14 the 
law “recognizes that unwanted, demeaning, or threatening sexual 
conduct can limit women’s opportunities, ambitions, and rewards 
in workplaces and schools.”15 The legislature, however, did not 
always provide victims of sexual harassment adequate remedies.16 
In fact, it was not until the Civil Rights Act was amended in 1991 
that sexual harassment plaintiffs were entitled to the full range of 
damages available today in all employment discrimination 
                                                          
12 See Karen B. Brown, Not Color or Gender Neutral: New Tax 
Treatment of Employment Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 223, 256-58 (1998) (arguing that § 104(a) was enacted partly 
because of Congress’s intention to discount the importance of job bias 
injuries); Sager & Cohen, supra note 9, at 502 (arguing that heightened 
sympathy for victims of physical injuries does not justify a tax exclusion 
favoring physical injury victims over non-physical injury victims); Mark J. 
Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78 
WASH. U.L.Q. 1341, 1485 (2000) (stating that employment discrimination 
victims suffer substantial injuries and are entitled to the § 104(a) tax exclusion 
just as much as victims of physical injuries). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003). 
14 Id. 
15 GWENDOLYN MINK, HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICAL 
BETRAYAL OF SEXUALLY HARASSED WOMEN 3 (2000) (arguing that although 
there is currently a statutory basis for relief for sexual harassment victims, 
those victims are still socially and politically demeaned). 
16 Id. at 24. See infra Part I.A (discussing the development of sexual 
harassment law and available remedies). 
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cases.17 
A. Development of Sexual Harassment Law 
By prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first statute to provide relief 
to women who experienced sexual harassment.18 Title VII states 
that it is an “unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . 
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”19 The text of Title VII does not specifically mention 
“sexual harassment,” and victims first had to persuade courts that 
sexual harassment constituted discrimination on the basis of sex.20 
Initially, courts were not receptive.21 In 1974, the first claim of 
                                                          
17 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); see also MINK, supra note 15, at 24. Prior 
to the 1964 Act, victims of sex discrimination, and therefore sexual 
harassment, had no federal statutory recourse. Id. 
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The 1964 Act only prohibited racial discrimination 
in employment when it was first introduced to Congress. 110 CONG. REC. 
H2577-84 (1964). The prohibition of sex discrimination in employment was 
added during the congressional debates on the bill. Id. In fact, it is believed 
that members of Congress opposed to the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
actually included the prohibition on sex discrimination in employment to help 
defeat the passage of the bill. Stephanie Schaeffer, Sexual Harassment 
Damages and Remedies, 73 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 § 6 (1999). 
20 MINK, supra note 15, at 24; Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 6. Plaintiffs 
asked the courts to recognize that sexual harassment was an “unlawful 
employment practice . . . because of . . . sex,” as prohibited by Title VII. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (2003). 
21 MINK, supra note 15, at 24; see Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 
F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that plaintiffs subjected to sexual 
advances by their supervisor had not been discriminated on the basis of their 
sex); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974), 
available at 1974 WL 10528 (ruling that plaintiff’s assertion of sexual 
harassment was not discrimination on account of sex), rev’d sub nom. Barnes 
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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sex discrimination based on sexual harassment was dismissed.22 
The court explained that the woman had been discriminated 
against not because she was a woman, but because of her refusal 
to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor.23 The following 
year, another court denied two women relief under Title VII, 
finding it was “ludicrous” to hold that the activity involved 
constituted sex discrimination in employment.24 The court 
reasoned that the alleged sexual advances made by the supervisor 
were merely attributed to his “personal urge,” without any 
relation to a discriminatory policy of the employer.25 Therefore, 
the court found that his actions could not constitute sex 
discrimination in employment. 26 
It was not until 1976, in Williams v. Saxbe, that a court ruled 
                                                          
22 Barnes, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 123. 
23 Id. Paulette Barnes alleged that her supervisor at the Environmental 
Protection Agency had asked her to begin an affair and told her that doing so 
would improve her employment position. Id. She declined, and was eventually 
fired. Id. The court found against her, maintaining that this was a “personal 
controversy underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal 
relationship.” Id. 
24 Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). In 
Corne, two plaintiffs, Jane Corne and Geneva DeVane, alleged that they had 
been repeatedly subjected to verbal and physical advances from their 
supervisor, Leon Price. Id. They also stated that because they did not want to 
cooperate with Mr. Price, they resigned from their positions as clerical 
workers. Id. Therefore, they argued that they had been subjected to a sex 
discriminatory condition of employment. Id. See MINK, supra note 15, at 25 
(discussing Corne). 
25 Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 162. The court stated: 
Mr. Price’s conduct appears to be nothing more than a personal 
proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism. By his alleged sexual advances, 
Mr. Price was satisfying a personal urge. Certainly no employer 
policy is here involved; rather than the company being benefited in 
any way by the conduct of Price, it is obvious that it can only be 
damaged by the very nature of the acts complained of. Nothing in the 
complaint alleges nor can it be construed that the conduct complained 
of was company directed policy which deprived women of 
employment opportunities. 
Id. at 163. 
26 Id. 
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in favor of a sexual harassment plaintiff.27 The claimant, Diane 
Williams, alleged that she was humiliated and fired after rejecting 
sexual advances from her supervisor.28 The District Court for the 
District of Columbia ruled that she had demonstrated 
discrimination based on her sex pursuant to Title VII.29 The 
defendant argued that sex discrimination was not demonstrated 
because there had been no gender stereotyping but, rather, the 
plaintiff was fired for refusing to accept her supervisor’s sexual 
advances.30 The court stated that this argument was “an 
erroneous analysis of the concept of sex discrimination as found 
in Title VII . . . .”31 To the contrary, the court found that 
Congress intended broad construction of Title VII to include a 
discrimination claim based on a “rule, regulation, practice or 
policy . . . applied on the basis of gender,” even if it did not 
arise out of an employer’s “well-recognized sex stereotype.”32 
After Williams, courts commonly accepted Title VII sexual 
harassment claims,33 making Title VII the main basis of relief for 
                                                          
27 Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D. D.C. 1976). 
28 Id. at 655. Ms. Williams alleged that after she refused the sexual 
advance of her supervisor, Mr. Brinson, he continued to harass and humiliate 
her by, among other things, giving her unwarranted reprimands for her job 
performance. Id. at 655-56. After investigating her allegations, the EEOC 
informed Ms. Williams that a “finding of no discrimination was proposed.” 
Id. at 656. At an administrative hearing, the complaints examiner found no 
discrimination on the basis of sex because “the evidence did not establish ‘any 
causal relationship’ between her rejection of Mr. Brinson and his subsequent 
treatment of her and her ultimate termination.” Id. Ms. Williams then sued in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia to recover damages under Title 
VII. Id. at 655. 
29 Id. at 657-58. 
30 Id. at 657. 
31 Id. at 658. 
32 Id. 
33 MINK, supra note 15, at 48. Both Barnes and Corne were eventually 
overturned so that the plaintiffs were allowed to pursue their sexual 
harassment claims under Title VII. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), rev’g Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 
1974), available at 1974 WL 10528; Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 19 
Empl. Prac. Dec. P9181 (D. Ariz. 1978), available at 1978 WL 205, rev’g 
390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). There is still some debate over whether 
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victims of sexual harassment.34 
In 1980, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), a federal agency created pursuant to § 705 
of Title VII, published guidelines for employers to demonstrate 
preventive measures employers should take to eliminate sexual 
harassment in the workplace.35 In addition, the EEOC guidelines 
                                                          
same-gender sexual harassment qualifies as discrimination on the basis of sex. 
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (ruling 
that same sex harassment is actionable); Debra L. Raskin, Sexual Harassment 
in Employment, SG 083 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 691, 729 (2000) (providing a general 
discussion about the development of same-gender sexual harassment case law). 
34 Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 6. Plaintiffs may also sue for sexual 
harassment under several other federal statutes. Debra L. Raskin, Sexual 
Harassment in Employment, Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights 
Actions in Federal and State Courts, SG083 A.L.R.-A.B.A. 691, 799 (2002). 
For instance, plaintiffs may sue pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986 for 
conspiracy to deprive them of their legal rights. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986 
(2003); see Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that women are protected by § 1985 from conspiracies of sex 
discrimination); Palace v. Deaver, 838 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
(allowing assertion of conspiracy to sexually harass plaintiff in order to deny 
her equal protection rights). Plaintiffs may also sue under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2003); see Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (ruling in favor of a plaintiff 
asserting a Title IX sexual harassment case against a public school). 
In addition, most states now have anti-discrimination statutes that entitle 
women to sue for sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. See 
Debra S. Katz & Alan R. Kabat, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, SH039 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1111 (2002) (giving an overview of current sexual harassment 
law). Alabama is the only state that does not have a race or sex discrimination 
law. Id. at 1235. See, e.g., California Fair Employment and Housing Act, 
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900-96 (2003); New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (2001); see Katz & Kabat, supra at 1235 (providing a 
complete list of all state anti-discrimination law citations). 
35 JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 17, 409 (5th ed. 
2001) (discussing the creation and purposes of the EEOC); MINK, supra note 
15, at 24 (discussing the role of the EEOC in the development of sexual 
harassment law). The guidelines were first published on November 10, 1980. 
ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 2.8 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the use of EEOC guidelines in the 
law of sexual harassment). 
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included definitions of sexual harassment to help victims 
recognize and pursue their claims.36 The EEOC guidelines define 
sexual harassment as: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, 
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature 
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of 
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for 
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) 
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment.37 
The EEOC is authorized to enforce federal anti-
                                                          
36 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 409. Although these 
guidelines are not binding on the courts, they are a guide for what constitutes 
actionable sexual harassment, and many courts still refer to them in making 
rulings on sexual harassment claims. Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 14 (1999) 
(providing an overview of the EEOC guidelines stating what is actionable 
sexual harassment); see, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-
66 (1986) (approving and relying on the EEOC guidelines in making its 
decision). “The Commission has applied the Guidelines in its enforcement 
litigation, and many lower courts have relied on the Guidelines.” U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Enforcement Activities, Dec. 4, 
2002 [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Activities], at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/enforce.html. 
37 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2003). Employers are held liable for acts of 
sexual harassment committed by their employees. § 1604.11(d). The EEOC 
guidelines state, “With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an 
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where 
the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have 
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and 
appropriate corrective action.” Id. In addition, an employee may hold an 
employer liable for harassment caused by a non-employee if the employer (or 
its agents or supervisory employees) knew or “should have known of the 
conduct and fail[ed] to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” § 
1604.11(e). These policies provide an incentive for employers to implement 
programs encouraging sexual harassment prevention. FRIEDMAN & 
STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 409. 
MEADMACROX.DOC 6/25/03 5:28 PM 
810 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
discrimination laws by receiving complaints from employees who 
believe they have suffered employment discrimination.38 Before 
suing in federal court for a violation of employment 
discrimination laws, potential plaintiffs must first file a complaint 
with the EEOC.39 If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe 
that the discrimination has occurred, it attempts to reach a 
resolution between the individual filing the charge and the 
responding employer.40 The EEOC may also file lawsuits in 
federal court on behalf of employees who believe they have been 
discriminated against or allow the charging party to file an action 
in court without further EEOC involvement.41 
The Supreme Court decided its first sexual harassment case, 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in accordance with the EEOC 
guidelines.42 The Court explicitly acknowledged the EEOC 
definition of sexual harassment, ruling that employers can be 
liable for two types of harassment: quid pro quo harassment and 
harassment that creates a hostile work environment.43 Quid pro 
                                                          
38 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 409. See also EEOC 
Enforcement Activities, supra note 36. 
39 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 409. 
40 EEOC Enforcement Activities, supra note 36. All charges the EEOC 
receives are classified into three categories: “Category A” includes charges 
that are given priority in investigation efforts and settlement efforts “due to the 
early recognition that discrimination has likely occurred; “Category B” 
includes charges that require further investigation to determine whether 
discrimination has occurred; “Category C” includes charges that are 
unsupported or non-jurisdictional and are closed immediately. Id. 
41 Id. In 1972, the federal government authorized the EEOC to file 
lawsuits on behalf of workers. KAREN J. MASCHKE, LITIGATION, COURTS, 
AND WOMEN WORKERS 3 (1989) (providing the history of sex discrimination 
in employment and the judicial response to such claims). Parties may 
voluntarily participate in the EEOC’s alternative dispute resolution program, 
where a neutral mediator assists in confidentially resolving discrimination 
issues between parties. EEOC Enforcement Activities, supra note 36. The 
EEOC may also file lawsuits on behalf of employees in “egregious” 
discrimination cases or file amicus curiae briefs to support EEOC positions. 
Id. 
42 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 7 (discussing 
the impact of Meritor on the law of sexual harassment). 
43 Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 14. If liability is proven, the same types 
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quo harassment occurs when an employment benefit has been 
conditioned, implicitly or explicitly, on an employee’s 
compliance with an unwelcome sexual activity.44 On the other 
hand, hostile environment sexual harassment involves unwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace.45 According 
to Meritor, hostile work environment sexual harassment is 
actionable when it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter 
                                                          
of remedies are usually available for both types of sexual harassment cases, 
depending on the circumstances of each individual case. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
5(g) (2003). “If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged 
in . . . an unlawful employment practice . . . , the court may . . . order such 
affirmative action as may be appropriate . . . or any other equitable relief as 
the court deems appropriate.” Id. “In an action brought by a complaining 
party under [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5] against a respondent who engaged in 
unlawful intentional discrimination . . . the complaining party may recover 
compensatory and punitive damages . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003). 
Federal district courts have discretion over which remedies will be available to 
plaintiffs on a case by case basis. Id.; Schaeffer, supra note 19, at §14. 
44 MINK, supra note 15, at 50. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 
(9th Cir. 1979) (finding quid pro quo harassment where the plaintiff was fired 
after refusing supervisor’s sexual advances); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 
654 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding sexual harassment where the plaintiff was 
discharged after refusing her supervisor’s sexual advances). 
45 LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE 3 (Matthew B. Schiff & 
Linda C. Kramer eds., 2d ed. 2000) (providing an overview of sexual 
harassment litigation tactics and information for claimants). See e.g., Meritor 
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment 
occurred where the plaintiff was subject to many unwelcome sexual advances 
and was even raped on several occasions); Katz v. Doyle, 709 F.2d 251 (4th 
Cir. 1983) (finding sexual harassment where the plaintiff endured sexual slurs, 
insults and other offensive verbal harassment in the workplace); Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that sexual 
harassment occurred where an employee was subjected to demands for sexual 
relations from her supervisor and sexual language on numerous occasions). 
Catherine MacKinnon originally asserted the idea that hostile environment 
should be a recognizable form of sexual harassment. See generally, 
CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF THE WORKING WOMAN: 
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). MacKinnon declared that quid pro 
quo harassment was not the only type of harassment that could violate Title 
VII. Id. at 2, 40. 
MEADMACROX.DOC 6/25/03 5:28 PM 
812 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive 
working environment.’”46 
B. Damages Under Sexual Harassment Law 
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, only back pay, 
injunctions and other forms of equitable relief were available to 
prevailing sexual harassment plaintiffs under Title VII.47 The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act) changed this result—
presently, a plaintiff can be awarded many types of damages: 
reinstatement, back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive 
damages, attorneys’ fees and costs and pre-judgment interest.48 
The 1991 Act defines compensatory damages as including “future 
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-
pecuniary losses.”49 The 1991 Act’s expansion of available 
                                                          
46 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). This severity requirement was satisfied in Meritor. 
Id. Vinson described a situation where her supervisor made repeated requests 
for sexual favors while at work, fondled her in front of other employees, 
followed her into the women’s restroom and exposed himself to her and raped 
her on several occasions. Id. at 60. 
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2003). See Deborah F. Buckman, Award of 
Compensatory Damages Under 42 U.S.C.A. §1981A for Violation of Title VII 
of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 154 A.L.R. FED. 347, § 2 (1999) (discussing the 
expansion of available remedies under Title VII throughout the years). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003). See Buckman, supra note 47, at § 2; 
Schaeffer, supra note 19, at §§ 16-17. Pre-judgment interest is normally 
awarded on back pay and compensatory damages and accrues from the date 
the plaintiff was terminated until the date the plaintiff receives a judgment in a 
lawsuit for sexual harassment. Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 26. An award of 
pre-judgment interest ensures that the plaintiff is fully compensated for her 
economic losses. Id. The 1991 Act states that “[a] complaining party may 
recover punitive damages . . . if the complaining party demonstrates that the 
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices 
with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an 
aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2003). 
49 § 1981a(b)(3). Compensable pecuniary losses may include, but are not 
limited to, back pay and front pay. LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
CASE, supra note 45, at 24. Back pay compensates plaintiffs for the wages 
MEADMACROX.DOC 6/25/03 5:28 PM 
 TAXING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 813 
damages evidenced congressional recognition that victims of sex 
discrimination deserve compensation for all of their resultant 
harms.50 
According to the 1991 Act, employers may be liable for 
compensatory and punitive damages up to $300,000 per plaintiff, 
depending upon the size of the employer’s work force.51 
                                                          
they would have earned had they not been discriminated against, while front-
pay awards for future lost earnings. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F. 
Supp. 2d 1364, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1998). Basically, front pay compensates the 
victim for wages she loses while she is looking for employment comparable to 
the employment she would hold but for the discrimination. Id. Therefore, 
front pay is usually only awarded when it would be impracticable for the court 
to require the reinstatement or re-hiring of the victim. Id. at 1378-80. In 
addition, plaintiffs may also seek compensatory damages for other pecuniary 
losses such as moving expenses, job search expenses, medical expenses, 
physical therapy and other expenses reasonably incurred as a result of the 
discriminatory conduct. LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra 
note 45, at 447. 
50 See, e.g., Williams v. Pharmacia Opthalmics, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 791, 
794 (N.D. Ind. 1996), aff’d, 137 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1998) (ruling that a sex 
discrimination plaintiff’s award of $1,250,000 in compensatory and punitive 
damages be reduced only as far as the statutory maximum of $300,000 
because “compensation is the primary purpose of the new remedies provided 
by the 1991 Act”); see infra Part III.C and note 221 (describing the types of 
harms caused by sexual harassment). The plaintiff, Evelyn Williams, won her 
lawsuit based on the allegations that she had not been considered for a 
promotion and was later terminated because of her sex. Williams, 926 F. 
Supp. at 794. The court of appeals, struck down her punitive damage award 
but upheld her compensatory damage award. Id. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3) (2003). Under the 1991 law, damages are 
capped according to the number of employees working for the employer found 
liable for the harassment: an employer with between 15 and 100 employees 
can be liable for no more than $50,000; for an employer with 101 to 200 
employees, damages are capped at $100,000; for an employer with 201 to 500 
employees, the cap is $200,000; for an employer with more than 500 
employees, the cap is $300,000. Id. Because the cap applies to the amount of 
damages each plaintiff may recover from an employer, however, an employer 
might have to pay $300,000 to each plaintiff suing that employer for the same 
sexual harassment claim. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (stating “damages awarded 
under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party . . . 
$300,000”). On the other hand, just because a single plaintiff brings several 
different sex discrimination claims does not mean the plaintiff may recover 
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Therefore, when a jury awards more than $300,000 to a sexual 
harassment plaintiff, the judge must reduce the award to what she 
deems an appropriate amount pursuant to the damage cap 
provision.52 After compensatory and punitive damage awards are 
granted, the court may also award attorneys’ fees and costs to 
compensate a successful plaintiff for the expense of bringing the 
action.53 There are two general reasons why attorneys’ fees are 
                                                          
$300,000 in damages for each one of her claims. Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 
1193 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 64, L. Ed. 2d 50 (U.S. 1998) 
(holding that sex discrimination and retaliation plaintiff could not recover the 
statutory maximum on each of her asserted claims but, rather, could only 
recover the statutory maximum once to compensate for all her claims 
combined). When plaintiffs request punitive or compensatory damages the 
court is not to inform the jury of the statutory caps put on damage awards. 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2003). This requirement enables the jury to make its own 
determination of appropriate damages based on the facts of the case without 
any influence from the monetary limits of the statute. See Buckman, supra 
note 47, at § 5 (discussing the expansion of available damages under Title VII 
and the statutory cap on those damages). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3) (2003). When a jury award is excessive, the 
trial judge has discretion on how far to reduce the award below the damage 
cap. Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 31. Therefore, courts differ on whether to 
reduce excessive awards to the statutory maximum or below the statutory 
maximum. See, e.g., Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(upholding the trial judge’s reduction of an award to no lower than the 
statutory maximum of $300,000, where the plaintiff was awarded more than 
$5 million in punitive and compensatory damages). But see Hennessy v. Penril 
Datacomm Networks, 69 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that when the 
jury awards punitive damages in excess of the statutory cap, under certain 
circumstances, the award may be reduced to an amount below the statutory 
maximum). 
53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2003). See also Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 
35; CONTE, supra note 35, at §6.55. Title VII states that “the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the 
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the 
costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the 
same as a private person.” § 2000e-5(k). The use of “the Commission” refers 
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See supra text 
accompanying notes 35-41 (describing the purposes of the EEOC). If the 
plaintiff loses her lawsuit and the employer prevails, the prevailing employer 
may only recover attorneys’ fees if the court finds that the “plaintiff’s action 
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought 
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recoverable pursuant to Title VII. First, compensation for 
litigation expenses is the last step in restoring the plaintiff to the 
position she would have been in if the harassment had not taken 
place.54 Second, there would be less of an incentive to file sexual 
harassment lawsuits if plaintiffs had to bear the costs of hiring 
attorneys and pursuing their claims.55 Courts have broadly 
construed the provision of Title VII allowing recovery of 
attorneys’ fees to fully compensate victims for their injuries and 
encourage victims to vindicate their civil rights.56 
II. TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS 
Historically, the United States tax code excluded personal 
injury damage awards from income taxation.57 Through the Small 
Business Job Protection Act, however, Congress significantly 
narrowed this exclusion.58 Just five years after expanding 
damages available under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress 
amended the tax code to limit the exclusion to damages received 
on account of physical personal injuries.59 In addition, the 
                                                          
in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 
421 (1978). 
54 LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra note 45, at 496. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 496; see Brandau v. Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1808, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (U.S. 1999) (holding that 
an award of nominal damages in a hostile work environment case entitled the 
plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees from defendant); see also CONTE, supra 
note 35, at § 6.55. 
57 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1995); F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole 
Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Tort Damages for 
Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 726 (1997). 
58 Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 
1755 (1996); see infra Part I.C (discussing the implications of the Small 
Business Job Protection Act’s amendment to the tax code). 
59 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 
1981(a) (2003). See supra Part I.B (discussing the expansion of remedies 
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 102-04 (discussing the taxation of non-physical injury damage awards in 
light of the expansion of remedies). 
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distinction between physical and non-physical injuries generated 
disagreement among circuit courts about the tax treatment of 
attorneys’ fees awarded in non-physical injury cases.60 
A. Personal Injury Taxation 
The taxation of damages has undergone many changes since 
the federal income taxation program was first adopted in 1913.61 
As early as 1918, damage recoveries for personal injuries were 
excluded from the calculation of gross income, regardless of the 
type of injury.62 Two major theories developed on why Congress 
excluded all personal injury damage recoveries.63 The first notion 
is that damage awards for personal injuries are not “income” per 
se; therefore, they should not be taxed as “income.”64 This 
theory derives from the historically accepted common law 
definition of “income.”65 For taxation purposes, income is “a 
gain that adds to the capital already owned by the person.”66 If 
damage awards compensate individuals for losses caused by 
personal injuries, they cannot constitute “gains” in capital 
                                                          
60 See infra Part II.D and text accompanying notes 140-42 (discussing the 
split among circuits on how to treat contingent attorneys’ fee awards). 
61 U.S. Const. Amend. XVI. “The Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived . . . .” Id.; Hubbard, 
supra note 57, at 732. 
62 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254 § 213(b)(6), 20 Stat. 1057, 
1066 (1919); Hubbard, supra note 57, at 741. Thus, at that time, damage 
awards based on non-physical personal injuries received the same tax 
treatment as those for physical personal injuries. 26 U.S.C. § 104 (1995). The 
relevant section of the tax code provided, “In General . . . gross income does 
not include . . . the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or 
agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of 
personal injuries or sickness.” Id. 
63 Hubbard, supra note 57, at 738 (providing theories for the exclusion 
since Congress did not provide an explanation). 
64 Id. at 739. 
65 Id. at 736. 
66 Id.; see Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 
(1913) (stating that “[i]ncome may be defined as the gain derived from capital, 
from labor, or from both combined”). 
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because they are actually “returns” of capital.67 If recoveries for 
personal injuries are merely returns of capital, they are outside 
the tax code’s definition of taxable “income.”68 A second 
possible explanation for the exclusion is that Congress made a 
humanitarian policy decision benefiting tort victims by refusing 
to tax their damage awards.69 Congress might have been 
suggesting that victims of personal injuries deserve compensation 
without an additional tax burden.70 
To determine which damage awards should be excludable 
from income taxation, courts first had to clarify what constituted 
“personal injuries” within the meaning of the original exclusion 
provision.71 During the 1920s, both the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue and the Board of Tax Appeals ruled that alienation of 
affection and defamation constituted personal injuries, excluding 
damage awards from taxation.72 The Board of Tax Appeals stated 
that the damages “[made] the plaintiff whole as before the 
injury” and did not constitute a gain in income.73 Therefore, the 
                                                          
67 Hubbard, supra note 57, at 739. For example, in O’Gilvie v. United 
States, the Court stated that the exclusion of personal injury damages from 
taxation has been based on the decision not to tax damages that are making up 
for a loss to the victim. 519 U.S. 79, 80 (1996). See also Comm’r v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co. 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955). “The long history of 
departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable [is based] 
on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of capital . . . .” Id. 
68 Hubbard, supra note 57, at 739. See also Stratton’s Independence, 231 
U.S. at 415 (stating the historically accepted definition of “income” to be a 
“gain”). 
69 Hubbard, supra note 57, at 738-39. 
70 Id. at 739. 
71  Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254 § 213(b)(6), 20 Stat. 1057, 
1066 (1919); see supra note 62 (providing the language of the tax code’s 
original exclusion of personal injuries from gross income). 
72 Sol. Op. 132, 1922-1 C.B. 92 (1922) (ruling that damages awarded for 
alienation of affection, defamation and surrender of a minor’s custody did not 
constitute income); Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927) (excluding 
damages awarded for defamation suit brought against former employer for 
publishing defamatory statements). See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1356 
(describing the implications of the Solicitor General’s opinion in 1992 on the 
definition of income). 
73 Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1025. 
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damages were excluded from taxation.74 Consistent with this 
principle, during the 1950s several Internal Revenue rulings held 
that the personal injury tax exclusion applied to compensation 
payments for inhumane treatment by enemy governments to 
former prisoners of war.75 In 1960, the Treasury ruled that 
damages paid pursuant to a lawsuit or settlement based on “tort 
or tort-type rights,” as opposed to contract rights, would be 
excludable from income taxation.76 
The passage of the federal civil rights acts required courts to 
apply the personal injury tax exclusion to damages awarded in 
the newly created employment discrimination causes of action.77 
The tax court first addressed the taxation of damages awarded in 
employment discrimination cases in 1975 in Hodge v. 
                                                          
74 Id. 
75 See Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14 (1958) (ruling that payments 
made by Austria to victims of Nazi persecution were excludable); Rev. Rul. 
56-462 1956-2 C.B. 20 (1956) (ruling that payments to prisoners of war in the 
Korean War were excludable); Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25 (1956) 
(ruling that payments to victims of Nazi persecution were excludable); Rev. 
Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213 (1955) (ruling that payments to prisoners of 
war in World War II for violation of the Geneva Convention were 
excludable); Sager & Cohen, supra note 9, at 454, n.48 (indicating IRS 
rulings affirming the position that damages received from personal injuries 
were not taxable). 
76 Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1960); see Sager & Cohen, supra note 9, at 
454. 
77 F. Philip Manns, Jr., Restoring Tortiously Damaged Human Capital 
Tax-Free Under Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2)’s New Physical 
Injury Requirement, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 356-57 (1998). This is because, 
for the first time, tax courts were required to determine whether injuries 
caused by employment discrimination should be taxable income. Id. Courts 
differed on whether it was appropriate to look toward the nature of the injuries 
caused by violations of the Civil Rights Act or the nature of the damages 
provided to successful plaintiffs in determining the taxability of damage 
awards. Id. See Hodge v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975) (requiring 
taxation of a back-pay award granted in a racial discrimination case because of 
the nature of the damage award). But see Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 692, 
697 (9th Cir. 1983) (ruling that a damage award from a defamation action was 
excludable because of the nature of the claim). 
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Commissioner.78 The court concluded that back pay awarded in a 
Title VII employment case was taxable income because it was not 
based on a personal injury.79 The court further reasoned that 
since wages are ordinarily taxable income, an award for lost 
wages should be taxable as well.80 
Most circuit courts disagreed with the tax court’s approach in 
Hodge.81 During the 1980s, the Sixth and Ninth circuits changed 
the direction of the interpretation of the personal injury 
exclusion.82 These courts looked toward the nature of the claim 
rather than the nature of the damages awarded to determine 
whether the damages should be subject to income taxation.83 
                                                          
78 Hodge, 64 T.C. 616. The plaintiff, a former truck driver, alleged that 
he had been denied a job transfer from “city driver” to “line driver” because 
of his race. Id. at 617. He was awarded the difference between his salary in 
his current job and the job to which he had been denied a promotion. Id. He 
and his wife then attempted to exclude half of the damages awarded on the 
basis that he was being compensated for a personal injury. Id. at 618. The 
court ruled that the back-pay award was taxable income. Id. at 619. 
79 Id. The court did not rule on the taxability of a compensatory damage 
award because the 1991 Act had not yet been passed, so compensatory 
damages were not recoverable for Title VII claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5g 
(2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003). 
80  Hodge, 64 T.C. at 619. Therefore, it was the nature of the award that 
determined its taxability. Manns, supra note 77, at 359. 
81 Manns, supra note 77, at 359. See Rickel v. Comm’r, 900 F.2d 655, 
661-64 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing the tax court’s determination that the nature 
of damages rather than the nature of the claim should be determinative of the 
taxability of damages); Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(ruling that damages in a malicious prosecution and injury to reputation case 
were excludable because of the nature of the claims); Roemer, 716 F.2d at 
697. But see Thompson v. Comm’r, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989) (ruling 
consistent with Hodge that the claim for back pay was not excludable because 
it was essentially a contractual claim for unpaid wages, and therefore was not 
a tort-type award). On the other hand, the Thompson court ruled that 
liquidated damages were excludable from taxation because they had been 
awarded for a tort-type injury. Id. 
82 Threlkeld, 848 F.2d 81; Roemer, 716 F.2d 692; see also Manns, supra 
note 77, at 359. 
83 Manns, supra note 77, at 359. Although these cases did not deal with 
sexual harassment claims, they decided the tax treatment of damages received 
in connection with other non-physical injuries and therefore are influential in 
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First, in Roemer v. Commissioner the Ninth Circuit ruled that an 
award for defamation should be excludable because of the nature 
of the tort of defamation.84 The court determined that a 
defamation claim was a personal injury within the purview of § 
104(a)(2)’s exclusion.85 Ruling the damages excludable, the court 
stated that “the relevant distinction that should be made is 
between personal and non personal injuries, not between physical 
and nonphysical injuries.”86 
In 1986, the Sixth Circuit made a similar decision in 
Threlkeld v. Commissioner.87 The plaintiff sought to exclude his 
recovery for an injury to his reputation caused by a malicious 
prosecution.88 The Sixth Circuit adopted the tax court’s holding 
that any compensatory damages “received on account of any 
invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of 
being a person in the sight of the law” were excludable from 
income tax.89 The court further explained that to determine 
whether an injury was personal, “we must look to the origin and 
character of the claim . . . and not to the consequences that result 
from the injury.”90 Therefore, the nature of the actual injury, not 
the nature of the damages received from the lawsuit, was the 
dispositive factor in determining the tax treatment of the damages 
                                                          
deciding the tax treatment of damages received from sexual harassment 
lawsuits. See Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (“We must look to the nature of the 
underlying injury to determine excludability under [S]ection 104(a)(2).”); 
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697 (“We must look to the nature of the tort . . . to 
determine whether the award should have been reported as gross income.”). 
84 Roemer, 716 F.2d at 694 (ruling that Roemer, who won a lawsuit for 
defamation created by a false credit report, was entitled to exclude his damage 
awards from his gross income for tax purposes). 
85 Id. at 697-98. 
86 Id. at 697. 
87 Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
damages won by Threlkeld in a malicious prosecution suit resulting from his 
endurance of a series of false lawsuits were excludable from taxation). 
88 Id. at 81-82. 
89 Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308 (1986), aff’d, 848 F.2d 81 
(6th Cir. 1988). 
90 Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299. This analysis is termed the “nature of the 
claim” test. Manns, supra note 77, at 359-60. 
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awarded.91 The plaintiff’s recovery was excludable from income 
tax because the nature of the injury was “personal.”92 The court 
stated, “A personal injury has long been understood to include 
non-physical as well as physical injuries. Therefore, ‘personal’ 
must be defined more broadly than ‘bodily’ injury.”93 In addition, 
both the Roemer and Threlkeld courts held that lost earnings 
received on account of both physical and non-physical injuries 
were excludable from taxation.94 These rulings were made 
despite the fact that wages are ordinarily taxable as income.95 
B. The History of the Taxation of Employment Discrimination 
Recoveries 
During the years following Threlkeld, however, courts 
struggled to apply the nature of the claim test to different types of 
damage awards won in employment discrimination cases.96 In 
1992, the Supreme Court in United States v. Burke held that a 
back-pay award for a Title VII sex discrimination claim was 
                                                          
91 Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84; Douglas A. Kahn, Taxation of Damages 
After Schleier—Where Are We and Where Do We Go From Here?, 15 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 305, 308-09 (1995) (examining past court rulings about 
the taxation of personal injury damage awards). 
92 Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299. 
93 Id. at 1305. The types of non-physical injuries denied tax exclusion by 
§ 104(a)(2) include employment discrimination, slander, libel, defamation and 
wrongful death. Loiacono, supra note 2; see also Philip Buchan, New Hope on 
NonPhysical Injury Taxes, TRIAL, Jan. 1998, at 11. 
94  Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1300; Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 692, 697 
(9th Cir. 1983). 
95 Hodge v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975); see Threlkeld, 848 F.2d 
at 81 (ruling that lost wages award is excludable); Roemer, 716 F.2d at 693 
(ruling award for lost earnings to be excludable). 
96 Downey v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 150, 161 (1991), rev’d, 33 F.3d 836 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (ruling that damages received for age discrimination in employment 
were excludable from gross income); Comm’r v. Burke, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th 
Cir. 1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (ruling that a damage award for sex 
discrimination was excludable from gross income). The tax court in Downey 
stated, “Some confusion has arisen . . . when the focus has shifted from the 
source and character of the injury . . . to its consequences.” Downey, 97 T.C. 
at 161. 
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taxable.97 The Court found the equitable remedies available for 
Title VII claims distinguishable from the typical compensatory 
damages available for the tort-type personal injuries aimed at in 
the § 104(a) tax exclusion.98 Using its own version of the nature 
of the claim approach, the Court held that a claim could not be 
considered tort-like unless it provided remedies similar to 
traditional tort claims.99 For instance, the Court compared the 
damages available under Title VII, which only provided back 
pay, with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which 
provided for both compensatory and punitive damages.100 The 
                                                          
97 504 U.S. 229 (1992). This case was based on the pre-1991 amendment 
Civil Rights Act pursuant to which compensatory damages were not 
recoverable. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2003); Burke, 504 U.S. at 231; see 
Brent B. Nicholson, Recent Developments Concerning the Taxation of 
Damages Under Section 104(A)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 61 ALB. L. 
REV. 215, 218 (1997) (exploring the taxability of personal injury damage 
awards and the Supreme Court’s decision in Burke). The original plaintiff in 
Burke was Judy A. Hutcheson, who brought a Title VII claim in the Eastern 
District of Tennessee. Burke, 504 U.S. at 231. Other employees, including 
Therese A. Burke, joined, alleging that their employer had discriminated 
against them by denying salary increases on the basis of their sex. Id. They 
reached a settlement agreement with the employer and later petitioned the 
district court for a determination that the settlement payments were excludable 
from their gross income. Id. at 232. The district court ruled that the settlement 
payments were not excludable, and the Sixth Circuit reversed. Id. at 232. 
98 Burke, 504 U.S. at 237-38. Compensatory damages are typically 
granted for pain, suffering, emotional distress, or injury to reputation. 
Nicholson, supra note 97, at 218. The court looked back to the 1960 treasury 
regulation which stated that any case arising under a tort or tort-type right 
would be considered a personal injury and any damages flowing from such 
injury would be excludable. Burke, 504 U.S. at 234; Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) 
(1960); see supra text accompanying note 76. This type of analysis is termed 
the “tort-type” or “tort-like” analysis. See Manns, supra note 77, at 361. 
99 Burke, 504 U.S. at 237; Manns, supra note 77, at 360; see cases cited 
supra note 83 (discussing the nature of the claim approach). 
100 Burke, 504 U.S. at 240. At the time of the plaintiff’s claim, Title VII 
allowed courts to award “such affirmative relief as may be appropriate,” 
including back pay and reinstatement, as well as “any other equitable relief.” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2003); Buckman, supra note 47, at § 2. Title VIII, 
however, allowed plaintiffs to recover “actual damages” and “injunctive or 
other equitable relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) (1995). In addition, Title VIII 
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Court suggested that were compensatory damages recoverable 
under Title VII, a compensatory damage award would be 
excludable because the injury would be within the same category 
as tort-type injuries.101 
After the 1991 Act expanded the types of damages 
recoverable for discrimination suits, the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) ruled that those damages were based on personal injuries.102 
Therefore, “compensatory damages, including back pay, 
received in satisfaction of a claim of disparate treatment gender 
discrimination under Title VII . . . are excludable from gross 
income as damages for personal injury under Section 104(a) of 
the Code.”103 The ruling also held that this applied even if the 
compensatory damages were comprised only of back pay.104 
In Commissioner v. Schleier, however, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the back pay and liquidated damages received in 
settlement of an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
claim were not excludable from taxation.105 The Supreme Court 
                                                          
provides that the court may assess a “civil penalty” against the respondent. Id. 
101 Burke, 504 U.S. at 237. The court stated: 
Notwithstanding a common-law tradition of broad tort damages and 
the existence of other federal antidiscrimination statutes offering 
similarly broad remedies, Congress declined to recompense Title VII 
plaintiffs for anything beyond the wages properly due them—wages 
that, if paid in the ordinary course, would have been fully taxable. 
Thus, we cannot say that a statute such as Title VII, whose sole 
remedial focus is the award of back wages, redresses a tort-like 
personal injury within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) and the applicable 
regulations. 
Id. at 241. 
102 Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 CB 61 (1993); 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003); 
see infra Part I.B (describing the expansion of available remedies for sex 
discrimination in employment plaintiffs). 
103 Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 CB 61. The ruling also applied to disparate 
treatment racial discrimination under Title VII as well as amounts received 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. 
104 Id. The ruling was short-lived, however, as it was suspended. Rev. 
Rul. 95-45, 1995-1 C.B. 53 (1995). See infra text accompanying notes 117-19 
(discussing the IRS’s position after Rev. Rul. 93-88 was suspended). 
105 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995) (holding that a member of an age 
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granted certiorari to resolve the appellate court conflict about the 
tax exclusion of damages.106 At the time Schleier was decided, 
the ADEA provided only punitive damages and back pay as 
remedies.107 Therefore, the Court followed Burke’s “tort-type” 
reasoning to decide the available remedies were not sufficient to 
render the recovery excludable from income tax under § 
104(a).108 The Court found that the victim in Schleier suffered 
several different injuries when he was fired in contravention of 
the ADEA.109 Although emotional distress was a personal injury, 
                                                          
discrimination class action suit against United Airlines was required to pay 
income taxes on his entire $145,629 settlement, which included both back pay 
and liquidated damages). Pursuant to the ADEA, an individual proving she has 
been discriminated against on the basis of age can sue to recover lost wages. If 
the discrimination is willful, the individual may recover liquidated damages in 
the amount equal to lost wages. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000). See Schleier, 515 
U.S. at 325-26. 
106 Id. at 327. David B. Jennings, The Supreme Court Gets Tough with 
I.R.C. S 104(A)(2) Exclusions: Taxpayer Discrimination Awards Suffer Injury 
as a Result of Commissioner v. Schleier, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 866 
(1996) (reporting on the status of the taxation of damage awards prior to 
1996). The case was specifically taken to resolve a split among the Ninth, 
Seventh and Fifth circuits, which had conflicted over whether back pay and 
liquidated damages received in age discrimination suits were excludable. 
Schmitz v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994); Downey v. Comm’r, 33 
F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994); Schleier v. Comm’r, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994). 
107 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 626 (1994). “Amounts owing to a person as a 
result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum 
wages or unpaid overtime compensation . . . provided that liquidated damages 
shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 626(b). The Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston ruled 
that liquidated damages received pursuant to the ADEA are considered 
punitive damages. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). 
108 Schleier, 515 U.S. 323; Jennings, supra note 106, at 866. 
109 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330; Kahn, supra note 91, at 329. One injury he 
may have suffered was emotional distress. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330. The 
plaintiff was fired from his position at United Airlines at the age of sixty, 
according to the company’s policy at that time. Id. at 325. He and other 
employees sued the employer in a class action seeking lost earnings, liquidated 
damages, injunctive relief and other relief. Id. at 326. The emotional distress 
he suffered could have stemmed from the emotional pain and humiliation from 
being fired from his job. Id. at 329. Another injury he suffered was the 
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he was not compensated for it through his lawsuit.110 He was 
compensated for the loss of his job through back pay, but this 
was an economic injury and not a personal injury.111 Therefore, it 
did not satisfy the tort-type Burke test, and could not be excluded 
from income tax.112 
Even though the Court found that ADEA damages were not 
consistent with tort-type rights to satisfy Burke, the Court further 
stated that the Burke test was not the final analysis.113 Instead, the 
Court articulated a two-part test to determine whether the tax 
exclusion applied.114 The Court stated that the exclusion applied 
only when the damages “(i) [were] received through prosecution 
or settlement of an action based upon tort or tort-type rights . . . 
and (ii) [were] received on account of personal injuries or 
sickness.”115 Therefore, because the plaintiff’s settlement award 
was not based on a personal injury, he could not exclude the 
award from his gross income.116 
Following Schleier, on December 30, 1996, the IRS issued 
another ruling on the subject.117 The ruling stated that in 
employment discrimination cases, lost wages must be included in 
the calculation of gross income, but emotional distress awards 
could be excluded.118 This ruling superseded the ruling issued 
prior to Schleier, and conformed the IRS’s position to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Schleier.119 
                                                          
economic loss from having his job taken away. Id. at 330-31. 
110 Kahn, supra note 91, at 329. The plaintiff had won a set of “liquidated 
damages,” but the Court considered those to be punitive damages, and 
therefore not received on account of a personal injury. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 
323. Thus, they could not be excluded. Kahn, supra note 91, at 329. 
111 Kahn, supra note 91, at 329-30. 
112 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334. 
113 Id. at 333-34; Jennings, supra note 106, at 883. 
114 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 333-34. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 337. 
117 Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6 (1996). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. See supra note 104 (citing the suspension of the ruling in effect 
prior to Schleier); supra text accompanying notes 102-04 (explaining the IRS 
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In the same month, the Supreme Court held that punitive 
damages for physical injuries were not excludable under § 
104(a).120 Although the case involved punitive damages awarded 
for a physical injury, the opinion included an important 
discussion of the policy supporting § 104(a)’s historical tax 
exclusion of certain damage awards.121 The Court questioned § 
104(a)’s exclusion of lost wages from taxation, stating that 
exclusion for that type of damages goes “beyond what one might 
expect a purely tax-policy related ‘human capital’ rationale to 
justify.”122 The Court observed that exclusion of lost wages 
entitled the victim to a windfall because she would not have to 
pay taxes on wages that she would ordinarily have paid if not for 
the personal injury.123 The Court was suggesting that just as 
punitive damages, which serve to punish wrongdoing, did not 
restore “human capital,” neither did an award for lost wages; 
therefore, neither should be excludable from gross income.124 
C. Taxation of Compensatory Damage Awards After the Small 
Business Job Protection Act of 1996 
In 1996, through a provision in the Small Business Job 
                                                          
ruling in effect prior to the Supreme Court decision in Schleier). 
120 O’Gilvie v. U.S., 519 U.S. 79 (1996) (holding that the surviving 
spouse of a tort victim was required to pay taxes on punitive damages won in 
the victim’s suit for personal injuries). This case was decided after § 104(a) 
was amended in 1996, but the decision was based on the pre-amendment 
statute. Id. In 1995, the relevant section of the tax code provided that “gross 
income does not include . . . the amount of any damages received . . . on 
account of personal injuries or sickness.” 26 U.S.C. § 104 (1995). The 
plaintiffs in the case were the husband and children of a woman who died of 
toxic shock syndrome in 1983. O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 81. The plaintiffs sued 
the manufacturer of the product that had caused her death and were awarded 
$1,525,000 in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages. Id. The 
plaintiffs paid income tax on the punitive damages but argued that they should 
be refunded. Id. 
121 O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 82-90. 
122 Id. at 86. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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Protection Act (SBJPA),125 Congress created a bright line rule to 
determine which damage awards would be taxable in the 
future.126 Although the SBJPA was best known for its increase of 
the minimum wage and tax cuts to small businesses,127 it also 
contained a provision amending § 104(a) to state that only non-
punitive damages paid on account of physical injuries or physical 
sickness may be excluded from gross income.128 
The amended statute also explicitly states that, with one 
                                                          
125 Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996). 
126 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003). The SBJPA was codified throughout 
several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, but the damage award 
amendment is specifically codified in 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2). Id. 
127 Pub. L. No. 104-188. The Conference report on the Act stated its 
purposes were to: 
[P]rovide tax relief for small businesses, to protect jobs, to create 
opportunities, to increase the take home pay of workers, to amend the 
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 relating to the payment of wages to 
employees who use employer owned vehicles, and to amend the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 to increase the minimum wage rate and 
to prevent job loss by providing flexibility to employers in complying 
with minimum wage and overtime requirements under that Act. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-737 (1996). 
128 Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 110 Stat. 
1755 (1996). The relevant post-amendment sections read: 
(a) In General. Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not 
in excess of) deductions allowed under Section 213 (relating to 
medical to medical, etc. expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross 
income does not include— 
. . . 
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) 
received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or 
as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or 
physical sickness. 
. . . 
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated 
as a physical injury or physical sickness. 
26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003). See supra note 62 for the pre-amendment code 
sections. 
MEADMACROX.DOC 6/25/03 5:28 PM 
828 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
notable exception,129 emotional distress is not within the 
definition of physical injuries or sickness.130 This means that a 
lawsuit based on emotional distress alone will not trigger the § 
104(a)(2) exclusion for damage awards.131 On the other hand, if a 
claim for emotional distress is attached to a physical personal 
injury, compensatory damages received for emotional distress 
can be excluded from the individual’s gross income.132 To clarify, 
if an individual receives a compensatory damage award or 
settlement stemming from a physical personal injury, the entire 
award would be excludable from taxation.133 In contrast, if an 
                                                          
129 The portion of a compensatory damage awards allotted to the 
reimbursement of medical expenses relating to emotional distress stemming 
from any personal injury (physical or non-physical) may be excluded from 
gross income. § 104(a); A. Van Lanckton & Joseph A. Brear, Jr., Federal 
Tax Treatment of Personal Injury Damages, 44 PRACTICAL LAWYER No. 3, 
59, at 60 (1998). 
130 26 U.S.C. § 104; see supra note 128 (providing the exact language of 
the statute’s emotional distress reference). Compensatory damages received on 
account of wrongful death actions or loss of consortium claims are excludable 
from gross income pursuant to § 104(a)(2). Internal Revenue Service, Lawsuit 
Awards and Settlements, DIGITAL DAILY, at 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/page/0,,id=7050,00.html [hereinafter Lawsuit 
Awards and Settlements] (last visited April 18, 2003). The House Committee 
Report for the 1996 amendment states: 
If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, 
then all damages (other than punitive) that flow therefrom are treated 
as payments received on account of physical injury or physical 
sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the injured 
party. For example, damages (other than punitive) received by an 
individual on account of a claim for loss of consortium due to the 
physical injury or physical sickness of such individual’s spouse are 
excludable from gross income. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 88 (1996). 
131 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003). 
132 See Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets 
Physical But Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 
51, 87 (1997) (explaining the different interpretations of the emotional distress 
provision in § 104(a)(2)); see also Coyle, supra note 8 (stating, “If a plaintiff 
received damages for pain and suffering attendant to a physical injury, the 
plaintiff could still deduct those damages from gross income.”). 
133 § 104(a)(2); Robert Margolis, Personal Injuries—Physical and 
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individual were to recover compensatory damages stemming 
from a non-physical personal injury, the entire award would be 
taxable.134 
According to the 1996 House Ways and Means Committee 
Report on the SBJPA, one reason for the amendment was to end 
confusion about the tax treatment of damages in non-physical 
injury cases, in light of decisions such as Schleier.135 Although 
the full reasoning for Congress’s distinction between physical and 
non-physical injuries remains speculative, the origin of the 
amendment is easily traceable to the federal government’s 
continuing search for revenue.136 To increase federal funds, 
                                                          
NonPhysical, 1 MERTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX’N § 7.91 (2002). This 
exclusion applies to a lost wages award a plaintiff recovers in a physical injury 
lawsuit. § 104(a)(2). Any punitive damages, however, would not be 
excludable for any type of injury pursuant to § 104(a)(2). See id. This could 
theoretically cause a problem in a situation where a plaintiff in a physical 
injury case is awarded a lump sum settlement including both punitive and 
compensatory damages. Lanckton & Brear, supra note 129, at 63. If the 
award comes from a trial by jury, the jury will state which part of the award 
was attributed to the compensatory damages as opposed to punitive damages. 
Id. If the award comes from a settlement, however, the person who prepares 
the tax payer’s tax return must determine which portion of the award is 
attributable to punitive damages or compensatory damages. Id. There is a 
good faith requirement for this, and the preparer must look at all the evidence 
as well as the initial complaint requesting certain amounts for damages. Id. 
This also sends a message to potential plaintiffs in physical injury lawsuits to 
consider the tax consequences of their categorization of damages when they 
prepare their initial complaints. Id. 
134 § 104(a)(2); see Lanckton & Brear, supra note 129, at 60 (giving an 
example of tax consequences to plaintiff who wins damages for a non-physical 
injury). 
135 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737 (1996). 
The Supreme Court recently held that damages received based on a 
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act could not be 
excluded from income . . . . The House bill provides that the 
exclusion from gross income only applies to damages received on 
account of a personal physical injury or physical sickness. 
Id.; see also Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995). 
136 Marcia Coyle, U.S. Tax on Damages Under Fire: Bill to Repeal ‘96 
Levy Has Backing of Both Business, Plaintiff Bar, 21 NAT. L.J. 50, Aug. 9, 
1999, at A1. When Congress gave tax breaks to small businesses, it needed to 
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Congress made all punitive damage awards as well as all 
damages received on account of non-physical personal injuries 
taxable income.137 
D. Taxation of Attorneys’ Fees 
A separate but related issue to the taxation of compensatory 
damage awards is the taxation of contingent attorneys’ fees and 
costs. Contingent attorneys’ fees often make up a significant 
portion of the monetary damages successful plaintiffs in sex 
discrimination cases receive in their judgments or settlements.138 
It is settled that, similar to compensatory damage awards, 
attorneys’ fees and costs awarded to plaintiffs in cases based on 
physical injuries are excluded from income tax.139 On the other 
hand, confusion remains about how attorneys’ fees and costs 
awarded for claims of non-physical injuries should be taxed.140 
The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh circuits have held contingency 
fees excludable from gross income for federal income tax 
                                                          
recover the resultant loss in federal income. Id. 
137 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003); see also Coyle, supra note 136. This rule 
has not been changed since § 104(a) was amended in 1996. The changes in the 
amendment apply to awards received after August 20, 1996, unless received 
under a “binding written agreement, court decree, or mediation award in 
effect on (or issued on or before) September 13, 1995. Lawsuit Awards and 
Settlements, supra note 130. The estimated revenue return from the date of 
this amendment through the year 2000 was $230 million. Coyle, supra note 
136. 
138 Paul M. Jones, NonPhysical Personal Injury Settlements and 
Judgments: Amending the Internal Revenue Code to Exclude Attorney Fees, 35 
IND. L. REV. 245 (2001). The court may award a prevailing party a 
“reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs” in cases under Title VII. 42 
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2003); supra note 53. 
139 § 104(a); Jones, supra note 138, at 246 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-52-
080 (Sept. 30, 1999), which held that damages awarded in a physical injury 
case were excludable from gross income). 
140 Jones, supra note 138, at 246 (commenting on the “crucial shift” 
taking place “with respect to the income tax treatment of attorney fees 
awarded in non-physical personal injury settlements and judgments”). 
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purposes.141 On the other hand, the First, Ninth, and Federal 
circuits have held that contingent attorneys’ fees must be included 
in gross income and then may be declared as a miscellaneous 
itemized deduction.142 
The Seventh Circuit, in Kenseth v. Commissioner, tried to 
resolve the dispute between a divided tax court’s decision.143 The 
court ruled that a portion of the plaintiff’s settlement award used 
to pay a contingent attorney’s fee had to be included in his 
calculation of gross income.144 The court held that when a 
taxpayer pays a lawyer pursuant to a contingency fee agreement, 
the taxpayer receives the benefit of the funds because the court 
allows the taxpayer to recover the full amount of the fee through 
the lawsuit.145 Since the taxpayer benefits from the use of the fee, 
the award must be included in the calculation of gross income, 
                                                          
141 Id. at 247. These courts have explained that because state law in these 
jurisdictions gives attorneys ownership rights in the income received in the 
settlements or judgment awards, the plaintiff may exclude that portion of the 
award from his or her own gross income. Id. at 247. See Clarks v. United 
States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying the holding in Cotnam and 
declining to follow the assignment of income approach); Davis v. Comm’r, 
210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000) (allowing plaintiff to exclude portion of 
damage award paid to plaintiff’s attorneys); Cotnam v. Comm’r, 263 F.2d 119 
(5th Cir. 1959) (allowing exclusion of the award from gross income because 
of Alabama law granting attorneys rights to the fees). 
142 See Fredrickson v. Comm’r, 166 F.3d 342 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring 
attorneys’ fees awarded to be included in plaintiff’s calculation of his gross 
income); Alexander v. Comm’r, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995) (requiring 
plaintiff to declare fees as deduction on income tax return); Baylin v. United 
States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (ruling that a portion of plaintiff’s 
award paid to attorneys should be included in taxpayer’s gross income); Jones, 
supra note 138, at 247. These courts take the “assignment of income” 
approach, reasoning that since plaintiffs “earn” the income from attorneys’ 
fees awards, they cannot assign that income and avoid paying taxes on it. 
Jones, supra note 138, at 249. 
143 114 T.C. 399 (2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
contingent attorney’s fee awarded in settlement was not excludable from 
plaintiff’s gross income). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 413. The court was using the “assignment of income” approach, 
as described infra note 158. 
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even though the attorney actually receives that portion of the 
award.146 The court stated, however, that the plaintiff would be 
allowed to declare his legal fees as a miscellaneous itemized 
deduction.147 
Unfortunately, the ability to declare an attorneys’ fee award 
as a miscellaneous itemized deduction can create further negative 
tax consequences for some plaintiffs.148 The limitations already 
placed by the tax code on miscellaneous itemized deductions can 
create situations where plaintiffs are taxed on their entire awards, 
including the portions paid to their attorneys.149 Usually, the most 
severe limitation on miscellaneous itemized deductions is the 
“alternative minimum tax.”150 This rule entirely disallows 
                                                          
146 Kristina Maynard, The Fruit Does Not Fall Far from the Tree: The 
Unresolved Tax Treatment of Contingent Attorney’s Fees, 33 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 991, 1016 (2002) (arguing that courts should require plaintiffs to include 
attorneys’ fees awards in their gross income). 
147 Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 413. 
148 Jones, supra note 138, at 256. 
149 Id. One limitation put on miscellaneous itemized deductions is that 
miscellaneous itemized deductions are only deductible to the extent that the 
aggregate amount of those deductions exceeds two percent of adjusted gross 
income (AGI). 26 U.S.C. § 67(a) (2003); Maynard, supra note 146, at 1010. 
If the deductions do not amount to more than two percent of a person’s AGI, 
they cannot be deducted at all. Aaron C. Charrier, Taxing Contingency Fees: 
Examining the Alternative Minimum Tax and Common Law Tax Principles, 50 
DRAKE L. REV. 315, 325 (2002) (examining the circuit split on the tax 
treatment of contingent attorneys’ fees and arguing that the current tax 
doctrine contradicts the purpose of contingency fee agreements). For example, 
assume that an individual wins $300,000 in a sex discrimination lawsuit in 
addition to a $150,000 attorneys’ fees award. Her AGI will be $300,000. See 
26 U.S.C. § 62 (2003) (providing a list of items that must be deducted from 
an individual’s gross income to arrive at the amount of AGI); Maynard, supra 
note 146, at 1010 n.120 (illustrating calculation of AGI). If she tries to deduct 
the $150,000 fee award, 26 U.S.C. § 67(a) requires that she only be allowed 
to deduct the amount of the attorneys’ fee award that exceeds two percent of 
her AGI ($300,000). 26 U.S.C. § 67(a). Two percent of her AGI is $6,000. 
Therefore, she would still be required to pay tax on $6,000 of her award. See 
Jones, supra note 138, at 255 (providing a hypothetical illustration of the two 
percent requirement for miscellaneous itemized deductions). 
150 26 U.S.C. §§ 55-58 (2003). Maynard, supra note 146, at 1011 (“Even 
more onerous than the limitations on deductions for legal fees for regular tax 
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miscellaneous itemized deductions by people with significant 
miscellaneous itemized deductions.151 The amount intended for 
deduction is added back into the income tax base, and taxes are 
then paid on the deduction.152 Moreover, the attorneys’ fees will 
be subject to double taxation—the plaintiff’s attorney will also 
pay his or her own income tax on the attorneys’ fee award, 
despite the fact that the plaintiff is already paying taxes on the 
award.153 
An example of the negative effects of the double taxation of 
attorneys’ fees is illustrated by the case of an Iowa citizen named 
Don Lyons.154 Mr. Lyons won a sex discrimination lawsuit and 
                                                          
purposes is the treatment of such expenses under the Alternative Minimum 
Tax.”). The alternative minimum tax is in place to prevent taxpayers with 
“substantial economic income” from avoiding “significant tax liability by 
using exclusions, deductions, and credits.” Charrier, supra note 149, at 331 
(quoting the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, 432 (1986)). 
151 Charrier, supra note 149, at 324-26; Jones, supra note 138, at 255. 
The alternative minimum tax rule is triggered when an individual’s tentative 
minimum tax exceeds the amount the individual would normally pay in taxes 
on his AGI. 26 U.S.C. § 51(a)(1)-(2) (2003); Charrier, supra note 149, at 
326. Tentative minimum tax is found by calculating the individual’s alternative 
minimum taxable income, which is usually the individual’s gross income 
before making any itemized deductions. Id. at 326. If the amount of tax an 
individual would pay on the alternative minimum taxable income exceeds the 
amount she would pay on her AGI with the deduction, the individual will owe 
the alternative minimum tax. Id. at 326. The alternative minimum tax is the 
difference between the amount the individual owes in taxes on her AGI and 
the amount the individual would owe on her alternative minimum taxable 
income. Id. at 326-27. Thus, in effect, the alternative minimum tax provision 
requires individuals to pay taxes on both their regular income and the income 
listed as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. Id. 
152 Jones, supra note 138, at 255; see also Charrier, supra note 149, at 
326-28 (providing an illustration of how the alternative minimum tax works). 
153 See Jones, supra note 138, at 256 (arguing that the double taxation of 
attorneys’ fees should be abolished). 
154 146 CONG. REC. S7160-03, S7163 (July 18, 2000) (statement by Sen. 
Grassley of Iowa, in introducing H.R. 1997 and 4570, quoting a letter sent by 
Don Lyons, a citizen of Iowa, regarding the current consequences of the 
taxation of attorneys’ fees). 
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received $15,000 in damages.155 After being taxed on this award, 
Mr. Lyons was left with $9,533.156 In a letter to Congress 
requesting statutory revision to eliminate the tax consequences to 
Mr. Lyons, his attorney, Victoria L. Herring, stated that she 
would be requesting a fee reimbursement in the amount of 
$150,000.157 Ms. Herring illustrated that if this request was 
granted by the court, Mr. Lyons would be required to pay 
$67,791 in taxes on the entire award.158 In Mr. Lyons’s 
jurisdiction, plaintiffs are required to pay tax on attorneys’ fee 
awards.159 Therefore, after applying his net damage award, 
$9,533, to the tax payments he was required to make on his 
attorneys’ fees, he would still owe the government $58,236 
altogether.160 This was more than two-thirds his normal annual 
salary and was required despite the fact that his attorney would 
also be paying income tax on the award of attorneys’ fees.161 
Even though he would be able to deduct the fee award as a 
miscellaneous itemized deduction, the triggering of the 
alternative minimum tax would require him to pay tax on the 
award anyway.162 
According to his letter, Mr. Lyons would be required to pay 
$5,467 in taxes on his adjusted gross income (AGI).163 Mr. 
                                                          
155 Id. at S7163. Don Lyons sued under Title VII alleging that he was 
retaliated against by his employer because he had “helped” his coworker in 
filing a sex discrimination complaint against the employer. Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at S7164. Mr. Lyons’ attorney stated in her letter to Congress that 
her fee request was based on her “hourly rate of $180.00 an hour (a rate much 
less than that of lawyers in other cities, and probably less than the two defense 
lawyers from Chicago who tried the case).” Id. She further stated, “The fees 
and expenses amount may seem high, but is the result of a fair amount of 





162 Id. Ms. Herring stated, “Not only will I pay taxes on this figure 
(gladly so), but my client will also and without the ability to deduct the sum 
due to the pernicious effect of the alternative minimum tax!” Id. 
163 Id. His AGI would be equal to his gross income less any itemized 
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Lyons’s alternative minimum taxable income (AMTI) would be 
his regular taxable income, subject to the provisions of sections 
56 and 58 of the Internal Revenue Code.164 Section 56(b)(1)(A)(i) 
prohibits miscellaneous itemized deductions.165 Therefore, Mr. 
Lyon’s AMTI would be $165,000 because it would include his 
attorney’s fee award (which he would list as a miscellaneous 
itemized deduction) and his other income ($15,000 in damages 
from his lawsuit).166 Assuming Mr. Lyons’s tentative minimum 
tax would exceed the tax owed on his AGI ($15,000), the 
alternative minimum tax rule would require that Mr. Lyons’s 
entire AMTI be taxed as if it had not been reported as a 
deduction at all.167 Instead, he would owe the difference between 
his tentative minimum tax and his regular tax on his regular 
taxable income, in addition to his regular tax.168 Therefore, he 
would essentially have to pay taxes on his AGI of $15,000 in 
addition to taxes owed on his deduction of $150,000.169 In effect, 
he would be taxed as if he had made no deduction whatsoever.170 
                                                          
deductions he makes. 26 U.S.C. § 62 (2003). For example, if Mr. Lyons had 
not earned any other income besides his damages and attorneys’ fee award, his 
AGI would be $15,000 ($165,000 gross income less than $150,000 attorneys’ 
fee deduction equals $15,000). Id. Mr. Lyons’s actual gross income for that 
year is unavailable. 
164 26 U.S.C. § 55(b)(2)(A) (2003); Charrier, supra note 149, at 326. 
165 26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2003); Charrier, supra note 149, at 327. 
“In determining the amount of the alternative minimum taxable income of any 
taxpayer . . . no deduction shall be allowed . . . for any miscellaneous 
itemized deduction.” § 56(b)(1)(A)(i). 
166 See supra note 164. 
167 See Charrier, supra note 149, at 326-27 (providing a hypothetical 
illustration of how the alternative minimum tax provision works); Jones, supra 
note 138, at 254-56 (illustrating how to calculate tentative minimum tax rates). 
168 26 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1)-(2) (2003); Charrier, supra note 149, at 327. 
Mr. Lyons would owe the difference between his tentative minimum tax and 
the $5,647 that he would owe in regular tax. Id.; see text accompanying note 
164. 
169 Charrier, supra note 149, at 327. 
170 Id. 
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III. EFFECTS OF SECTION 104(A)(2) ON VICTIMS OF SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 
Section 104(a) adds to the negative effects that victims of 
sexual harassment already endure, such as the emotional harms 
and social stigmas associated with sexual harassment.171 Section 
104(a) creates economic disincentives for coming forth with 
sexual harassment lawsuits because it requires successful 
plaintiffs to pay taxes on their compensation.172 In addition, the 
taxation of damages based on non-physical injuries insinuates that 
sexual harassment is not a serious injury because damages based 
on physical injuries are excludable from income tax.173 
A. Social Stigma and Emotional Harms of Sexual Harassment 
In the interests of justice and equality for men and women, 
Congress recognized the need to compensate victims for the 
suffering associated with sexual harassment.174 Unfortunately, 
although this type of discrimination is a compensable injury, 
many women still have trouble coming forward with allegations 
against their employers when they have been sexually harassed.175 
One major explanation is that sexual harassment involves 
                                                          
171 See infra Part III.A (discussing the implications § 104(a) has on 
victims of sexual harassment); see generally MINK, supra note 15 (discussing 
the harms and stigmas created by sexual harassment). 
172 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003); see infra Part III.B (discussing the 
financial consequences imposed by the tax code upon successful plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination cases). 
173 See supra note 12; infra Part III.C (discussing the social and political 
consequences of § 104(a)); see also infra note 221 (discussing various injuries 
caused by sexual harassment). 
174 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003); see supra Part I (discussing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 and the types of compensatory damages available to 
victims of sexual harassment). 
175 MINK, supra note 15, at 7. 
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discussing personal, private subjects.176 In addition, bringing a 
complaint of sexual harassment often requires the victim to 
endure personal attacks on her character as well as suggestions 
that she may have provoked the harassment, exaggerated it or 
even lied about it.177 For exposing their harassers, women can be 
stigmatized, blacklisted on the job market or ostracized by 
colleagues and friends.178 
The highly publicized cases of Paula Jones, who sued former 
President Bill Clinton on allegations of sexual harassment,179 and 
                                                          
176 Id. at 7. 
177 Id. at 27. See, e.g., CLARA BINGHAM & LAURA LEEDY GANSLER, 
CLASS ACTION: THE STORY OF LOIS JENSON AND THE LANDMARK CASE THAT 
CHANGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 349 (2002) (describing the first sexual 
harassment class action, initiated by Lois Jenson and her fellow female mine 
workers, who had endured years of hostile environment sexual harassment). In 
the case of Lois Jenson, opposing attorneys pointed to the fact that she had 
been raped and had not reported the crime at the time of the incident. Id. at 
348-49. They argued that since she did not report it, she must have been lying 
about the rape as well as her sexual harassment claim. Id. at 349. 
Furthermore, despite an agreement between the parties to keep her rape 
testimony private, the judge deciding the case included details about the rape 
in his opinion, which then became public information. Id. at 349. Other 
potential members of the class action lawsuit refused to join because they did 
not want to have to answer painful questions about their families. Id. at 286. 
178 MINK, supra note 15, at 101. A woman who complains of sexual 
harassment in the workplace runs the risk of being “branded a troublemaker—
or worse, a feminist.” MINK, supra note 15, at 81; see also BINGHAM & 
GANSLER, supra note 177, at 105 (describing the personal attacks Lois Jenson 
endured after filing a sexual harassment complaint with her employer). Lois 
Jenson started working for Eveleth Mines during the late 1970s. BINGHAM & 
GANSLER, supra note 177, at 3. After enduring years of pervasive sexual 
harassment, she came forward and filed a grievance with the mine worker’s 
union. Id. at 100. After word of her complaint spread around the mine, she 
found all four of her car tires slashed. Id. at 111. When she filed a complaint 
with the state attorney general, her coworkers immediately shunned her. Id. at 
126. “People stood together in groups giving her dirty looks, people avoided 
her.” Id. at 126. 
179 MINK, supra note 15, at 30. In 1998, Paula Jones’ lawsuit was 
dismissed by the Eighth Circuit on a motion for summary judgment. Id.; Dan 
Fruomkin, Case Closed, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1998, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/pjones/pjones.htm. 
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Anita Hill, who publicly accused Justice Clarence Thomas of 
sexual harassment,180 are poignant examples of the obstacles 
women face when alleging sexual harassment.181 Both Anita Hill 
and Paula Jones endured severe criticism and even public outrage 
for coming forth with allegations against their male 
supervisors.182 In particular, the public seemed to find it 
important that Paula Jones had waited a number of years before 
speaking publicly about her alleged harassment.183 The delay was 
                                                          
Her lawsuit alleged that former Governor of Arkansas and United States 
President William Jefferson Clinton sexually harassed her while she was 
employed with the State of Arkansas. Text of Paula Jones’ Complaint, All 
Politics, Jan. 13, 1997, available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/ 
1997/01/13/jones.supremecourt/suit.shtml. Ms. Jones alleged that he had 
made unwelcome sexual advances toward her and that she had felt her 
employment would be threatened if she were to report the incident. Id. She 
further alleged that she was later terminated because she had rejected the 
sexual advances made by Mr. Clinton. Id. 
180 MINK, supra note 15, at 99-100. Anita Hill never actually filed a 
lawsuit against Justice Clarence Thomas, but during his Supreme Court 
appointment hearings in 1991, she accused him of having made sexual 
advances and harassing remarks towards her during their employment at the 
EEOC. Id.; Florence George Graves, The Complete Anita Hill, B. GLOBE 
MAG., Jan. 19, 2003, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/ 
2003/0119/coverstory.htm. 
181 Graves, supra note 180 (reporting that even after her testimony had 
ended, Ms. Hill faced media stakeouts at her home); Paula Jones’ Day In 
Court Draws Nearer, All Politics, Jan. 8, 1997, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/01/08/jones.morton/index.shtml 
(reporting that “everybody in America knows who [Paula Jones] is,” but 
recognizing the public’s “dismissive attitude” towards her). 
182 MINK, supra note 15, at 2. “The vicious personal attacks weathered by 
Anita Hill and Paula Jones are no different from those endured by many 
women who bring sexual harassment claims, although the attacks against Hill 
and Jones were far louder and more visible than most.” Id. After testifying at 
Justice Thomas’s appointment hearings, Anita Hill faced “death threats, 
strangers condemning her to hell, hostile stares” and was accused of “flat-out 
perjury.” Graves, supra, note 180. “The GOP had tried to portray Hill as a 
spurned woman who had fantasized a sexual relationship with Thomas.” Id. 
Paula Jones was portrayed as a “trailer park bimbo” in the public eye. Paula 
Jones’ Day in Court Draws Nearer, supra note 181. 
183 MINK, supra note 15, at 2, 117. Paula Jones was characterized as a 
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used against her as a way for society to judge the credibility of 
her claim.184 One possible reason she did not immediately come 
forward, though, is that she, like most victims of sexual 
harassment, first tried to cope with the harassment privately 
instead.185 
The fact that so many women over the years have had very 
little choice but to quietly endure the effects of sexual harassment 
is one reason the right to sue under Title VII exists—it legitimizes 
women’s experiences and encourages them to report incidences 
of sexual harassment.186 The Supreme Court has stated that the 
                                                          
“gold digger” for attempting to pursue her claim once Mr. Clinton had 
become president. Id. at 2. Mrs. Clinton stated on the Today Show, on 
January 27, 1998, that Ms. Jones’ claim against the president was part of a 
right-wing conspiracy against him. Id. at 117; Hillary Clinton: ‘This is a 
Battle,’ All Politics, Jan. 27, 1998, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/01/27/hillary.today. 
184 MINK, supra note 15, at 4-5. The public questioned Ms. Jones’s 
motives for coming forward with allegations of sexual harassment. Id. at 5. 
Some stated that Hill was more credible than Jones because Hill had been 
forced to come forward while Jones did so voluntarily. Anna Quindlen, A Tale 
of Two Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at A1. 
185 MINK, supra note 15, at 81; see supra notes 184-86 (discussing the 
various disincentives for coming forth with sexual harassment lawsuits). 
Women are particularly susceptible to struggling privately with sexual 
discrimination in “hostile work environments,” where the complaint process is 
long and tedious. MINK, supra note 15, at 81. Lois Jenson, before 
commencing the first class action sexual harassment lawsuit in America, stated 
in her diary: 
It amazes me that through the years women have kept so silent, but 
think it should not amaze me, for I have done the same. Since it is 
against the law. In fact this is not an isolated case but merely that we 
do not go public. One thought comes to mind. How many violent 
crimes have emanated from women trying to handle harassment 
themselves? After all, companies have no set policy until it becomes a 
necessity and that means that a woman has tried everything she could 
first and then went to the company . . . . 
BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 177, at 105. 
186 BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 177, at 101. In referring to Title 
VII, in Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., the third circuit stated: 
Throughout this nation’s history, persons have far too often been 
judged not by their individual merit, but by the fortuity of their race, 
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purpose of the Civil Rights Act was “to achieve equality of 
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated 
in the past to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over 
other employees.”187 With so many personal, social and political 
consequences of speaking out about harassment, Title VII 
recognizes that there should be incentives to persuade women to 
expose incidences of harassment and encourage people to take 
steps to eliminate sexual harassment.188 The federal taxation 
scheme should be used to support this notion, not contradict it. 
                                                          
the color of their skin, the sex or year of their birth, the nation of 
their origin, or the religion of their conscientious choosing. Congress 
has responded to these pernicious misconceptions and ignoble hatreds 
with humanitarian laws formulated to wipe out the iniquity of 
discrimination in employment, not merely to recompense the 
individuals so harmed, but principally to deter future violations . . . . 
A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case accordingly acts not 
only to vindicate his or her personal interests in being made whole, 
but also as a ‘private attorney general’ to enforce the paramount 
public interests in eradicating invidious discrimination. 
31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated by 514 U.S. 1034, 115 S. Ct. 
1397, 131 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1995), reinstated by 65 F.3d 1974 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(ruling in favor of the plaintiff, who alleged sex and age discrimination in 
employment). Mardell was placed on probation and eventually discharged 
from her position as a manager for the Harleysville Life Insurance Company. 
Id. at 1222-23. She alleged that she was discharged on the basis of her sex and 
age, and that she had specifically been told that she “couldn’t be a good old 
boy” and that the insurance agents would think of her as a “wife.” Id. at 1223. 
The employer tried to counter these arguments by revealing evidence that Ms. 
Mardell had made false representations on her employment application and 
resume, and that, therefore, the employer could not be found liable for the 
employment discrimination. Id. at 1223. The court found for Ms. Mardell, 
stating that this type of “after-acquired evidence” did not absolve the employer 
from liability. Id. at 1237. 
187 Albermale Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). 
188 One way the government has done this is to create the EEOC. See 
supra Part I (discussing the purposes of the EEOC). 
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B. Section 104(a) as an Economic Disincentive to 
Commencing Sexual Harassment Lawsuits 
Section 104(a) creates yet another disincentive for victims of 
sexual harassment to speak out because it taxes any compensatory 
damages they might receive through lawsuits.189 A recent 
example is the case of Cynthia C. Spina, who was awarded $3 
million by a jury in her sex discrimination and harassment suit 
against her employer, the Forest Preserve District of Cook 
County.190 After winning $950,000 in attorneys’ fees, in addition 
to $3 million in punitive and compensatory damages, she still 
owed an additional $99,000 to the IRS.191 Therefore, after 
winning her lawsuit for one of the most egregious violations of 
Title VII ever seen, she owed more to the IRS than she was 
actually awarded.192 
The tax consequences for Ms. Spina were so burdensome that 
she asked the court to consider the taxation of her award when 
deciding by how much her jury verdict award should be 
reduced.193 In denying her argument, the magistrate judge stated 
that he was aware of the tax consequences and was not 
unsympathetic, but “Congress, not this Court, must correct any 
                                                          
189 See supra Part II (explaining the tax treatment of compensatory 
damages). 
190 Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 2d 764 
(2002). Ms. Spina won her sexual discrimination, harassment and retaliation 
claims against her employer. Id. at 767. She alleged that she had been berated, 
belittled and isolated by her male colleagues because of her sex. Id. at 767. 
She complained to her supervisors about her treatment, but the harassment 
only escalated. Id. at 767. Finally, she filed a complaint with the EEOC and 
filed suit shortly thereafter. Id. at 768. 
191 Liptak, supra note 6. There are no reports on Ms. Spina’s exact tax 
returns. See infra notes 196-200. 
192 Liptak, supra note 6. The magistrate judge presiding over Ms. Spina’s 
case stated that he did not know of another case in which a plaintiff had 
“endured such continuous harassment at the hands of so many different 
officers and superiors for such an extended period of time.” Spina, 207 F. 
Supp. 2d at 774. 
193 Spina, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 777. 
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shortcomings in the tax code’s application.”194 Although Ms. 
Spina sought an equitable exception in her circumstances, the 
court declined “[p]laintiff’s invitation to venture down a slippery 
slope and wage into this legal morass under a guise of equitable 
relief.”195 
There are several reasons why Ms. Spina’s award of 
approximately $4 million ended up costing her almost $100,000 
more than what she received.196 First, the judge was required to 
reduce Ms. Spina’s jury award from $3 million to $300,000.197 
The double taxation of attorneys’ fees and costs also caused 
negative tax consequences for Ms. Spina.198 When Ms. Spina was 
awarded approximately one million dollars in attorneys’ fees in 
addition to her compensatory and punitive damages, she had to 
pay income tax on the fees.199 Although she was in a jurisdiction 
where she could deduct the portion of the award allotted to the 
payment of attorneys’ fees, the large deduction triggered the 
alternative minimum tax and required her to pay tax on almost 
her entire award anyway.200 
                                                          
194 Id. (quoting Hukkanen Campbell v. Comm’r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314 
(10th Cir. 2001)). 
195 Id. 
196 Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 2d 764, 777 
(2002). 
197 Id. at 776. The judge did this in compliance with the cap put on 
compensatory damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 
1981(b)(3) (2003). See supra note 51 (discussing the damage cap provision of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also Buckman, supra note 47, at § 5. 
198 Coyle, supra note 8. In certain districts, taxpayers are required to pay 
taxes on the attorneys’ fees and costs they receive when their lawsuits are 
based on non-physical injuries. See supra note 142 (listing districts that require 
taxation of attorneys’ fees). Illinois, the state in which Ms. Spina brought her 
lawsuit, requires that plaintiffs pay tax on their awards according to the 
“assignment of income” approach. Liptak, supra note 6; see supra note 142 
(explaining the “assignment of income” approach). 
199 Coyle, supra note 8; Liptak, supra note 6. 
200 26 U.S.C. §§ 55-58 (2003). See supra Part II.D (illustrating the 
alternative minimum tax). Assuming that Ms. Spina made no additional 
itemized deductions and earned no additional income in the tax year, her 
alternative minimum taxable income amounted to $1,250,000. §§ 55-58. This 
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In addition, negative tax consequences can also arise when 
plaintiffs win lump sum back-pay awards in employment 
discrimination cases.201 The IRS requires the taxation of back-pay 
awards in the year received, even though the awards usually 
reflect several years’ of lost pay.202 As a result, those who win 
lump sum back-pay awards are often placed into higher income 
tax brackets (with higher assigned tax rates) than they would 
have been in had they received their wages on a regular basis.203 
Meanwhile, if back pay or lost wages are awarded in a physical 
injury case, they are not taxed at all.204 Thus, the tax code entitles 
                                                          
is because AMTI is equal to her AGI in addition to all miscellaneous itemized 
deductions. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65 (explaining alternative 
minimum taxable income). Her regular AGI would be equal to $300,000 
because she would be listing the $950,000 attorneys’ fee award as a deduction. 
26 U.S.C. § 62 (2003). The tentative minimum tax would then be established 
using her AMTI. Jones, supra note 138, at 255. She would be required to pay 
the difference between her tentative minimum tax and the regular tax she 
would owe on her regular AGI ($300,000). Id. Altogether, by operation of 
these rules in her particular situation, she owed approximately $99,000 in 
taxes. Liptak, supra note 6. 
201 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3402 (2003). Spina’s case does not mention 
whether Ms. Spina was awarded back pay. Spina, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 776. 
The court attributed $200,000 of her award to emotional distress while 
$100,000 was to compensate her for damage to her reputation. Id. at 776. 
202 26 U.S.C. § 104(a). The Internal Revenue Code does not include any 
provision allowing a lump sum award for back pay to be taxed over a number 
of years. 146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). Instead, it is 
taxed as a lump sum in the year that it was awarded by a jury or in a 
settlement. Id.; Successful Plaintiff Gets Extra Money to Cover Extra Tax, 
Says P.A. Court, 6 ANDREWS SEX. HARASSMENT LIT. REP. No. 8, at 12 (Oct. 
2000) (discussing the case of O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 
2d 443 (E.D. Penn. 2000), where the court awarded the plaintiff money to 
cover the negative tax consequences of receiving a lump sum back-pay 
award). 
203 146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). 
204 Id. The Supreme Court in O’Gilvie pointed out that an exclusion for 
lost wages actually entitles victims to a windfall in that they would ordinarily 
be required to pay income tax on those wages had they earned them through 
employment. O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86. After the 1996 amendment to § 
104(a), however, only victims of physical injuries are entitled to this 
preferential treatment. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003). 
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victims of physical injuries to another inequitable tax benefit.205 
All of this leads to the conclusion that when potential 
plaintiffs approach a lawyer about initiating sexual harassment 
litigation, they face another consideration—the possibility that, if 
they win, they may be in a worse financial position than when 
they started.206 Women who decide to bring sexual harassment 
claims already have to consider the risk of job loss, injury to 
their reputations and the economic consequences of losing their 
lawsuits.207 Now, they also must take into account the fact that, 
even if they establish liability, they may have to pay the IRS 
                                                          
205 See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2); see also Sager & Cohen, supra note 9, at 
448-49 (criticizing the distinction made between the exclusion of back pay in 
physical injury cases and the taxation of back pay in non-physical injury 
cases). Sager and Cohen argue that in all personal injury cases, damages for 
lost earnings should be taxable and damages received for pain and suffering 
should be excludable because damages should be taxed only if they 
compensate the taxpayer for money that would have been taxable if received 
under usual circumstances. Id. at 449-50. 
206 Liptak, supra note 6 (reporting that attorneys must now instruct clients 
on the potential effects of § 104(a) on their damage recoveries). As a general 
rule, in cases based on federal statutes, evidence and arguments about the tax 
consequences of verdict amounts may be introduced to the jury. See Kenneth 
G. Zaleski, Jury Instructions as to Tax Consequences, 5 MERTENS LAW OF 
FED. INCOME TAX’N § 24A:12 (2002). State laws vary on this issue, though. 
Id. The majority rule is that juries may not be told of the tax status of personal 
injury awards in state actions. Id. This principle was articulated in the leading 
case on the subject, Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, where the Supreme 
Court ruled that it was error not to instruct the jury as to the tax-free status of 
damages awarded in a Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) wrongful 
death action. 444 U.S. 490 (1980); Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 
U.S.C. § 51 (2003). In Norfolk, the plaintiff suffered fatal injuries during his 
employment as a fireman. Norfolk, 444 U.S. at 491. His estate sued under 
FELA and was awarded $750,000 of non-taxable damages by a jury. Id. The 
appellate court ruled that it was not error for the court to have not instructed 
the jury that the plaintiffs would not be required to pay tax on the award. Id. 
The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 498. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s 
ruling has often been limited to actions arising under FELA and, unfortunately 
for victims like Ms. Spina, is not always followed in cases arising under 
federal laws. See Zaleski, supra note 206. 
207 See supra Part III.A (discussing the harms of sexual harassment). 
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more than they recover in damages.208 Women are much less 
likely to take their chances suing employers for harassment if 
they think they may have to exhaust their financial resources 
litigating with no reward in the end.209 Instead, they are left to 
endure the personal effects of sexual harassment quietly, while 
those guilty of harassment escape any consequences.210 
The financial disincentives created by § 104(a)(2) may 
decrease the number of Title VII sexual harassment claims 
prosecuted by victims.211 Because meritorious lawsuits are 
burdened by § 104(a), this provision undermines the Title VII 
goals of enabling and encouraging victims to bring sex 
discrimination claims.212 If victims no longer have a reason to 
pursue lawsuits against those guilty of harassment, there will be 
no consequences in place for employers who violate Title VII and 
                                                          
208 See Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 764, 
777 (2002). 
209 Liptak, supra note 6 (citing Cynthia Spina’s lawyer, Monica 
McFadden, who said that the “tax laws will result in fewer civil rights 
cases”). Ms. McFadden went on to state, “It has an enormously chilling 
effect. I have to advise a person coming to me that it is entirely possible not 
only that any award they achieve will go to the Internal Revenue Service but 
that they will owe the Internal Revenue Service money.” Id. “It’s had a 
chilling effect on employment discrimination cases and dire consequences for 
some people. If people can’t afford to win, why would they go to the trouble 
of even pursuing the case, no matter how important or meritorious.” Coyle, 
supra note 8 (quoting Carlton Carl of the Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America (ATLA)). 
210 MINK, supra note 15, at 3. 
211 See supra note 209 (quoting an attorney on the resultant loss of 
lawsuits caused by the taxation of non-physical injury damage awards). 
212 Coyle, supra note 136. The Supreme Court in Meritor stated that Title 
VII “affords employees the right to work in an environment free from 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). The EEOC furthers this goal by asking 
employers to implement reporting systems that encourage victims of sexual 
harassment to come forward with claims. U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual 
Harassment, at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/currentissues.html (last visited 
March 21, 2003). 
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the EEOC guidelines.213 
Additionally, § 104(a)(2) discourages settlements because 
settlement payments are susceptible to the same tax treatment as 
trial awards.214 Furthermore, settlements often pose a financial 
problem for employers, just as they pose a problem for 
plaintiffs.215 Now that lawyers advise victims about the tax 
consequences of settlement awards,216 victims often seek 
increased monetary damages to compensate for the negative 
financial burdens they face regarding income taxes.217 Employers 
are discovering that they have to pay more than the plaintiffs 
would have sought if § 104(a)(2) did not make the award 
taxable.218 Businesses are further economically burdened by this 
because Title VII provides that only employers may be liable for 
sexual harassment, even when an individual employee committed 
                                                          
213 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 pt. 1 (1991). In his report to Congress on the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congressman Ford of Michigan stated: 
America is a better country because we as a people have moved 
forward toward the goal of eradicating discrimination. Nowhere is 
that more important than in the workplace. Of almost any sector of 
American life, the progress toward equality has been greatest in the 
workplace precisely because of strong federal equal employment 
opportunity laws. 
Id. By discouraging victims from utilizing the laws and guidelines put in place 
by the federal government, Congress is contradicting the very purposes for 
which those laws were enacted—to protect from evils of sex discrimination 
that occur in the workplace. 146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 
2000); see Wolff, supra note 13, at 1409 (examining the taxation of non 
physical injuries against the backdrop of the progress of the civil rights 
movement in the United States). 
214 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003) (stating, “gross income does not 
include . . . the amount of any damages . . . (whether by suit or 
agreement) . . . on account of personal physical injuries or physical 
sickness”); Coyle, supra note 136. 
215 Coyle, supra note 136 (explaining that businesses are paying plaintiffs 
for the negative tax burdens of their settlement awards). 
216 See supra note 209 (quoting a lawyer advising client of tax burdens). 
217 Coyle, supra note 136. 
218 Id. (quoting attorneys David Chashdan and Frederick M. Gittes, who 
stated that businesses have been paying more to individuals to cover tax 
consequences). 
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the harassment.219 Therefore, although the SBJPA was designed 
to give tax breaks to small businesses, it may in fact create an 
additional tax burden for businesses attempting to settle 
employment discrimination cases.220 
C. Section 104(a)(2) Denies the Reality of the Harms Caused 
by Sexual Harassment 
Victims of sexual harassment suffer a number of harms.221 As 
a result, the scope of harm for which recovery is permitted in 
sexual harassment cases is very broad.222 A victim may recover 
for more than just emotional distress—she may also sue for 
damages to reputation and career, loss of pride or self-respect, 
loss of enjoyment in life or career, impact on family or close 
friends and loss of community or social standing.223 The 
availability of damages in sexual harassment cases “demonstrates 
congressional recognition that discriminatory employment 
practices inflict injuries beyond mere loss of paycheck or 
                                                          
219 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003); Coyle, supra note 136. 
220 Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 
1755 (1996); see infra Part II.C (discussing the SBJPA). 
221 See LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra note 45, at 
447. Victims of sexual harassment may suffer from “stress, uncontrolled 
anger, alienation, helplessness, fright, tension, nervousness, distress, 
irritability, depression, persistent sadness, guilt, lability, anergia, 
hyperenergia, mood swings, impulsivity, emotional flooding, anxiety, fear or 
loss of control, escape fantasies, compulsive thoughts, rage episodes, 
obsessional fears, crying spells, vulnerability, diminished self confidence, and 
decreased self esteem and concentration.” Wolff, supra note 12, at 1457. 
Victims may also experience psychiatric disorders such as depression or post 
traumatic stress. Id. at 1458. In addition, these harms may lead to physical 
conditions, such as heart disease, ulcers, headaches, insomnia, stomach 
problems, weight loss, eating disorders and other chronic illnesses. Id. Sexual 
harassment may also strain the victim’s relationships with friends and family. 
Id. 
222 LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra note 45, at 447. 
223 Id. at 447; H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 15 (1991). “Victims of 
intentional discrimination often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering 
while on the job. This distress often manifests itself in emotional disorders and 
medical problems.” Id. 
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reduction in wage and benefits, and congressional intent that 
victims of employment discrimination should be compensated for 
those non-pecuniary injuries.”224 
In light of the myriad harms caused by employment 
discrimination and sexual harassment, it is difficult to understand 
why Congress distinguished between those harms and others 
caused by physical injuries.225 It appears that the government is 
using the policy of disparate tax treatment of physical and non-
physical injury damage awards to insinuate that sex 
discrimination is not as legitimate or serious an injury as a 
physical assault.226 “A victim of discrimination suffers a 
dehumanizing injury as real as, and often far more severe and 
lasting harm than, a blow to the jaw.”227 Yet, the federal tax code 
contradicts this statement by discriminating against those who are 
already victims of sex discrimination and taxing them differently 
                                                          
224 Williams v. Pharmacia Opthalmics, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 791, 794 
(N.D. Ind. 1996), aff’d, 137 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1998) (ruling that a sex 
discrimination plaintiff’s compensatory damage award should be set at the 
statutory maximum cap); see infra text accompanying note 50 (providing the 
facts of the case); see also supra note 51 (discussing damage award caps 
pursuant to Title VII). 
225 See supra note 221 (explaining harms of sexual harassment). “It is 
beyond question that discrimination in employment on the basis of sex . . . is, 
as . . . this Court consistently has held, an invidious practice that causes grave 
harm to its victims.” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992). 
“[T]he harms women and religious and racial minorities may suffer as a 
consequence of the various types of intentional discrimination are the same.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1 (1991). See also Wolff, supra note 12, at 1464 
(investigating the possibility of unconscious discrimination playing a part in 
the taxation of employment discrimination damage awards). 
226 See Brown, supra note 12, at 256-68 (highlighting the insinuation § 
104(a) makes regarding the importance of job discrimination injuries); Wolff, 
supra note 12, at 1485 (arguing that hidden prejudice is to blame for the 
unreasonable distinction § 104(a) makes between physical and non-physical 
injuries). 
227 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d at 1221, 1232 (3d Cir. 
1994). See also H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, (1991). (arguing for the 
expansion of available remedies to victims of sex and race discrimination). 
“[T]he principle of anti-discrimination is as important as the principle that 
prohibits assaults, batteries and other intentional injuries to people.” Id. 
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than victims of other damaging actions.228 
Most importantly, the policy of § 104(a)(2) is not justifiable 
in light of the progress this country has made since the Civil 
Rights Act was first enacted in 1964.229 After years of hard work 
and rallying against sex discrimination, victims of sexual 
harassment and other forms of discrimination won the right to go 
to court, prove that they have been victimized and receive 
relief.230 Yet, by taxing the victims of sexual harassment, the 
federal government invalidates the reality of those victims’ 
injuries.231 
In addition, § 104(a)(2) penalizes women for falling victim to 
sexual harassment in the first place.232 If the government seeks to 
use the tax code as a social tool, making policy decisions about 
the treatment of different societal injuries, it should conform its 
tax provisions to the political goal of eliminating discrimination 
in society.233 Yet, by forcing women to pay for pursuing sexual 
                                                          
228 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003). The exception allowing medical 
expenses for emotional distress to be excluded from income tax does not 
overcome the insinuation that non-physical injuries are less personally harmful 
than physical injuries. See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1480 Instead, it supports 
that perception because it suggests that unless a victim seeks medical help for 
his or her injuries, those injuries will not be regarded as “real.” Id. 
229 See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1480 (concluding that victims of non-
physical injuries endure harms as severe as physical injuries and should 
therefore receive the same tax treatment as victims of physical injuries); see 
also Sager & Cohen, supra note 9 (stating that “the national commitment to 
end unlawful discrimination is undermined when damages for the non-physical 
injury of discrimination are taxed more heavily than damages for physical 
harm”). 
230 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003); see supra Part 
I.A (showing authority for victims to sue for sexual harassment in court); see 
also Wolff, supra note 12, at 1484 (arguing that the progress of civil rights in 
the U.S. led to a backlash causing the double discrimination of non-physical 
injury victims). 
231 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2). 
232 146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). “The result of the 
[Small Business Protection Act of 1996] was to discriminate against people in 
civil rights cases.” Id. 
233 See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1486 n.1 (providing the history of 
Congress using the Internal Revenue Code to make social policy decisions); 
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harassment claims, the tax code re-victimizes the victims of 
sexual harassment. Rather than compensating them for their 
injuries at the expense of those liable for the harassment, § 
104(a)(2) adds to the misfortune victims of sexual harassment 
suffer.234 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND A SUGGESTION FOR THE 
FUTURE 
The negative consequences created by taxing sexual 
harassment damage awards must be remedied in the legislature.235 
Several solutions have been proposed, including one that 
Congress is currently considering.236 This note suggests that the 
solution best suited to address the negative tax treatment of 
employment discrimination cases involves taxing defendants 
rather than victims. 
A. Civil Rights Tax Relief Act 
A simple solution to the troubles of § 104(a) is for Congress 
to reverse its 1996 amendment and eliminate the disparate tax 
treatment of non-physical and physical injury damage awards.237 
Congress is currently considering the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act 
(CRTRA),238 which proposes to amend the tax code so that 
damage awards for unlawful discrimination would not be 
considered part of an individual’s gross income for tax 
                                                          
see also, 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2003) (providing for the ability to make tax 
deductible charitable contributions). 
234 146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). “The result of this 
taxation is that the attorneys and government make out better than the victims 
who had their rights violated.” Id. See supra note 221 (describing harms 
caused by sexual harassment). 
235 146 CONG. REC. S7160-03, (July 18, 2000). 
236 Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, H.R. 840, 107th Cong. (2001). The Civil 
Rights Tax Relief Act was first introduced in 1998. Coyle, supra note 136. 
The bill is supported by the House Way and Means Committee. Id. 
237 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003). 
238 H.R. 840. 
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purposes.239 Therefore, damages received on account of sexual 
harassment would receive the same treatment as physical injury 
damage awards.240 In addition, although the amendment would 
not allow exclusion of punitive damages or back-pay awards, it 
would allow income averaging of back-pay awards so they would 
no longer be taxed in lump sums.241 Pursuant to the amendment, 
                                                          
239 Id. The proposal would amend the tax code to state: 
(a) In General. 
(1) Exclusion. Gross income does not include amounts received 
by a claimant (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump 
sums or periodic payments) on account of a claim of unlawful 
discrimination. 
(2) Amounts covered. For purposes of paragraph (1), the term 
‘amounts’ does not include— 
(A) backpay or frontpay (as defined in section 1302(b)), or 
(B) punitive damages. 
Id. Many are advocating for the equal tax treatment of physical injury and 
employment discrimination damage awards. See Brown, supra note 12, at 223 
(arguing for the exclusion of damages for job bias recoveries); Coyle, supra 
note 8; Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of 
Employment Discrimination Recoveries under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: 
Income from Human Capital, Realization, and NonRecognition, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 549 (1994) (arguing that based on the human capital approach, damage 
awards for employment discrimination cases as well as physical injuries should 
be excludable from income tax); Loiacono, supra note 2. 
240 Supra note 239 (providing text of the proposed amendment). 
241 H.R. 840; see also 146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). 
The tax code would be amended to read: 
General Rule. If employment discrimination backpay or frontpay is 
received by a taxpayer during a taxable year, the tax imposed by this 
chapter for such taxable year shall not exceed the sum of— 
(1) the tax which would be so imposed if— 
(A) no amount of such backpay or frontpay were included in 
gross income for such year, and 
(B) no deduction were allowed for such year for expenses 
(otherwise allowable as a deduction to the taxpayer for such 
year) in connection with making or prosecuting any claim of 
unlawful employment discrimination by or on behalf of the 
taxpayer, plus 
(2) the product of— 
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back-pay awards would be taxed at the same rate as if the 
individual were still employed.242 Finally, the bill attempts to 
address the double taxation of attorneys’ fees by eliminating the 
requirement that victims pay taxes on attorneys’ fees recovered in 
successful lawsuits.243 
The CRTRA is a good solution—it would ensure that the tax 
treatment of damage awards in sexual harassment cases coincides 
with the policy goals of Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination.244 
                                                          
(A) the number of years in the backpay period and frontpay 
period, and 
(B) the amount by which the tax determined under paragraph 
(1) would increase if the amount on which such tax is 
determined were increased by the average annual net 
backpay and frontpay amount. 
H.R. 840. 
242 Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, H.R. 840, 107th Cong. (2001); 146 
CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). “The act provides for income 
averaging of back-pay awards, making it possible for the award to be taxed 
over the same number of years it was meant to compensate.” Id. 
243 H.R. 840. See 146 CONG. REC. S7160-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000) 
(stating that “this legislation ends the double taxation on attorney’s fees that 
are awarded to a victim in a discrimination case”). In addition, on August 5, 
2002, the mayor of Washington D.C. signed the nation’s first Civil Rights Tax 
Fairness Act, which mirrors the bill currently pending in Congress. NELA 
Applauds District’s Adoption of Nation’s First Civil Rights Tax Fairness Act; 
Asks Congress to Follow, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 2, 2002, available at 2002 
WL 22070164. Specifically, the new law amends the District of Columbia 
Official Code to exclude from gross income amounts received on account of 
unlawful discrimination and adds a new section to the tax code to allow the 
income averaging of back-pay and front-pay awards received from 
employment discrimination cases. Id. Although the local legislation does not 
address the problem on a national level, it does offer hope of increasing 
support for the passage of federal legislation. Id; see National Employment 
Lawyers Association, HR 840/S 917, The Civil Rights Tax Relief Act: Tax 
Equity for Targets of Discrimination, at http://www.nela.org/news/hr840/ 
endorsing.htm (last visited March 20, 2003) (providing a list of the current 
endorsing organizations of the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, including such 
organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, ABA Labor and Employment Section, and the American Small 
Business Alliance). 
244 H.R. 840. See generally Wolff, supra note 12, at 1343 (arguing that 
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The equal tax treatment of physical injury and employment 
discrimination damage awards would remove the suggestion that 
the harms created by sexual harassment are less important than 
the harms of physical injuries.245 Unlike an amendment that 
would tax all damage awards flowing from all injuries, the 
CRTRA ensures that victims are not re-victimized by the IRS.246 
Nevertheless, there are several problems with the CRTRA. 
First, in passing the bill, the federal government will lose the 
revenue that it gained through the taxation of all non-physical 
injury damage awards since the 1996 amendment.247 More 
importantly, though, the CRTRA misses an important 
opportunity to increase the negative consequences to employers 
                                                          
the equal treatment of physical and non-physical injuries would be more in line 
with the recognition that non-physical injuries can be as harmful to victims as 
physical injuries). 
245 See supra Part III.C (arguing that the tax distinction between physical 
and non-physical injuries insinuates that victims of non-physical injuries, such 
as sexual harassment, do not suffer real injuries). 
246 See Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be 
Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43, 51-52 (1987) (arguing that a tax 
exclusion for personal injury damage awards is inconsistent with the 
fundamentals of the tax code); Lawrence A. Frolick, Personal Injury 
Compensation as a Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1985) 
(asserting that the exclusion from gross income for personal injury awards 
should be eliminated in order to increase tax revenue). 
247 See supra note 137 (stating that the government has already received 
millions in revenue from the creation of the § 104(a)(2) amendment). Some 
have advocated for an amendment that would make all damage awards, for 
both physical and non-physical injuries, excludable. See, e.g., H.R. 2802, 
105th Cong. (1997); see Buchan, supra note 93, at 11 (discussing the bill as a 
means to restore the tax exclusion for non-physical injuries). Although this 
type of solution would ensure against any unreasonable distinctions made 
between different types of physical and non-physical injuries, this solution 
would result in a substantial loss in revenue. In this way, the Civil Rights Tax 
Relief Act has been viewed by some as the “middle road” because rather than 
providing for the equal treatment of all physical and non-physical injuries, the 
Civil Rights Tax Relief Act would provide for the equal treatment of physical 
injury and employment discrimination damages. See Buchan, supra note 93, at 
11 (describing the bill suggested by Rep. Gerald Solomon, who proposed that 
the damage exclusion be applied to employment discrimination awards, but not 
all non-physical injury damage awards). 
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found liable for sexual harassment.248 This is especially true 
because many tortfeasors are already allowed to declare payments 
to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases as income tax 
deductions.249 Therefore, although the CRTRA would entitle 
discrimination victims to equal tax treatment, Congress would 
still be allowing employers to deduct employment discrimination 
damage payments for income tax purposes.250 
B. A Solution for the Future: Taxing the Defendants, Not the 
Victims 
A better solution would be one that uses the tax code as a 
social policy tool to support the goals of Title VII and the EEOC 
guidelines to eliminate employment discrimination, while still 
providing the revenue that the taxation of non-physical injury 
damage awards currently provide through § 104(a).251 A statutory 
requirement that defendant employers compensate plaintiffs for 
the negative tax consequences they suffer when they are awarded 
compensatory damage awards or attorneys’ fees would satisfy 
both the victims and the government.252 This solution would keep 
§ 104(a) as it stands, requiring the taxation of damage awards in 
employment discrimination cases.253 Instead of changing § 
104(a), Congress should adopt a law stating that employers found 
liable for harassment are required to pay successful plaintiffs for 
                                                          
248 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003); see infra Part I.B (discussing the types of 
liability employers are exposed to for sexual harassment). 
249 See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1486 (arguing that the income tax 
deduction allowed for payments made by the tortfeasor should be eliminated in 
order to eliminate the inequalities of § 104(a)(2) while still providing financial 
revenue for the government). 
250 Id. See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1486 (calling for the elimination of 
the business expense allowance for payments to victims of employment 
discrimination). 
251 See supra note 137 (stating the estimated revenue from this tax 
provision). 
252 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003); See supra note 137 (stating the 
government’s revenue return on § 104(a)); supra Part III.B (discussing 
negative financial effects of § 104(a) on successful plaintiffs). 
253 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2). 
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the negative tax consequences posed by § 104(a)(2).254 Imposing 
such a requirement would use § 104(a) to burden parties 
responsible for perpetuating harassment rather than victims who 
are already harmed.255 
Some courts have attempted to implement this solution by 
requiring defendant’s to pay plaintiffs for the negative tax 
consequences of damage awards.256 For instance, the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania attempted to do so in a recent age 
discrimination case.257 In O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the 
                                                          
254 See infra Part III.B (discussing negative tax consequences of § 104(a)); 
see also Wolff, supra note 12, at 1486 (advocating the equal treatment of 
physical and non-physical injuries). Wolff advocates eliminating the taxation 
of non-physical injuries as well as eliminating the business expense allowance 
for payments to victims of employment discrimination. Id. This note’s 
proposal differs because it would keep § 104(a) the way it is—it would 
maintain the distinction between physical and non-physical injury damages. 
However, this note suggests adding a federal law that requires that the tax 
consequences posed to employment discrimination plaintiffs by § 104(a)(2) be 
paid by the employers found liable. Employers should have to reimburse the 
plaintiffs the negative consequences without declaring the tax payments as 
business expenses. 
255 See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234-35 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (stating that one purpose of anti-discrimination laws is to increase 
the burdens on employers held liable for the discrimination, so as to deter 
employment discrimination). 
256 O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) (awarding plaintiff additional damages for tax consequences of lump 
sum back-pay award); Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers, 55 P.3d 1208 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding plaintiff 
supplemental award to compensate for negative tax consequences caused by 
attorneys’ fee and back-pay award in sex discrimination case). See also EEOC 
v. Joe’s Stone Crab Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (ruling 
that a district court may award an additional damage award for negative tax 
consequences posed by a lump sum back-pay award, but declining to do so in 
that particular case because there was insufficient evidence to make 
appropriate tax calculations). 
257 O’Neill, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 446. The plaintiff had sued his former 
employer for the premature termination of his job, alleging that he had been 
terminated in willful contravention of the ADEA. Id. at 443. The plaintiff was 
awarded both back pay and front pay in a lump sum, rather than over a period 
of years, equal to what the plaintiff would have worked if he had not been 
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district court found the plaintiff entitled to receive money to 
cover the negative tax burdens in relation to his back pay and 
front pay because had he kept his employment, he would have 
received his salary over a number of years.258 The court reasoned 
that an award for the negative tax consequences, endured as a 
result of bringing an employment discrimination suit, was 
necessary to meet the goal of making the plaintiff “whole.”259 
Therefore, the court awarded him the difference between his tax 
liability for the back-pay and front-pay awards received in the 
lawsuit and the amount he would have owed in taxes had he 
received the money as wages.260 
A Washington court of appeals has also recently taken the 
initiative to allow a plaintiff to receive a supplemental damage 
award for negative tax consequences.261 The plaintiff, Ms. 
Blaney, was awarded $638,764 in damages and $235,625.38 in 
attorneys’ fees for winning her sex discrimination case based on a 
Washington state anti-discrimination statute.262 At trial, Ms. 
                                                          
terminated. Id. at 444. The plaintiff requested that the court add an award for 
the negative tax consequences posed by these awards. Id. at 446. 
258 Id. 
259 Id.; Susan Kalinka, O’Neil v. Sears, Roebuck and Co: Award of 
Damages for Increased Tax Liability, 79 TAXES 45, Jan 1. 2001, available at 
2001 WL8812786. The court also thought it was particularly important to 
award the plaintiff recovery for the negative tax consequences of his lump sum 
front-pay award because his front-pay award had already been reduced to 
present value. O’Neill, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 447. Therefore, the presumption 
was that he would invest the money and receive a return equal to his lost 
wages; however, the negative tax consequences of his award would leave him 
with less money to invest. Id. at 447. 
260 Id. at 449. Mr. O’Neill’s tax liability after the lawsuit was 
$67,164.96. Id. at 448. This was $38,780.05 more than what he would have 
owed had he been paid wages. Id. Therefore, the court awarded him 
$38,780.05 in addition to his back-pay and front-pay award of $237,332. Id. 
The court did not consider the negative tax consequences posed by the 
compensatory and liquidated damages the plaintiff had been awarded, in the 
amount of $281,736. Id. at 448. It only compensated the plaintiff for the 
consequences posed by the lump sum wages award. Id. 
261 Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 55 P.3d 
1208 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
262 Id. at 1210; Washington Law Against Discrimination, WASH. REV. 
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Blaney presented the testimony of a certified public accountant 
who stated that she would owe $244,753 in taxes as a result of 
her damage awards.263 To determine whether Ms. Blaney was 
entitled to compensation for the negative tax consequences, the 
court of appeals interpreted the anti-discrimination statute’s 
provision allowing the award of “actual damages.”264 The court 
construed “actual damages” to include a supplemental payment to 
“offset the adverse federal tax consequences to her from the . . . 
lump sum payment of the judgments on the damages award and 
attorney fees against it.”265 Therefore, the court remanded the 
case to determine the amount Ms. Blaney should be awarded for 
the negative tax consequences.266 
Similarly, parties negotiating settlement agreements have also 
tried to implement this type of solution by agreeing that the 
employers make increased settlement payments to cover the 
negative tax consequences posed to the victims.267 During many 
recent sexual harassment settlement discussions, employers have 
discovered that they have to pay extra money to compensate 
plaintiffs for the taxes that will have to be paid on the settlement 
payments.268 Employers who normally want to settle cases are 
instead finding that they are in a better position if they go to trial 
where plaintiffs cannot request compensation for negative tax 
consequences.269 If there were a statutory requirement that 
employers compensate plaintiffs for negative tax consequences 
                                                          
CODE 49.60.030(2) (2003). 
263 Blaney, 55 P.3d at 1210. 
264 WASH. REV. CODE 49.60.030(2); see Blaney, 55 P.3d at 1215 
(quoting the Washington statute). 
265 Blaney, 55 P. 3d at 1214. The court further stated that its ruling made 
practical sense because forcing plaintiffs to pay the taxes would “threaten to 
thwart meritorious suits because a highly successful plaintiff runs the risk of 
having the entire benefit of a judgment eliminated plus incurring a substantial 
tax liability to the Internal Revenue Service.” Id. at 1217. 
266 Id. at 1218. The court stated that on remand, the burden would be on 
Ms. Blaney to demonstrate the negative tax consequences. Id. 
267 Coyle, supra note 136. 
268 Id. 
269 See id. 
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both in court and through out of court settlements, however, 
employers would no longer be able to use trial to avoid the tax 
payments.270 This would decrease the burden on the courts by 
allowing more cases to settle.271 
This type of solution is particularly productive because 
victims of sexual harassment would no longer bear the financial 
burden of being successful in court.272 Compensating successful 
plaintiffs for negative tax consequences caused by § 104(a) will 
reduce the disincentives in place for victims of harassment to 
bring lawsuits to vindicate their civil rights.273 Women would no 
longer face the uncertainty of the tax consequences of their 
lawsuits. Instead, they would know that if they win, their 
employers would reimburse them for whatever taxes they may 
have to pay on their monetary damages.274 
Moreover, this solution is unique in that it creates an added 
incentive for employers to take measures to prevent sexual 
harassment in their workplaces.275 Requiring employers to pay 
                                                          
270 Coyle, supra note 136. “Because of the tax bite, businesses have to 
pay more or individuals have to take less to get settlements, or there are no 
settlements. A lot of cases are on the docket longer, and there are more 
trials.” Id. (quoting lawyer Frederick M. Gittes, partner at Spater, Gittes, 
Schulte & Kolman, of Columbus Ohio). 
271 Id. Advocates of the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act also state that its 
passage would reduce the burden on courts. Coyle, supra note 8. “If the IRS 
takes less in taxes from civil rights plaintiffs’ settlements, it will be easier for 
both civil rights plaintiffs and defendant businesses to reach just settlements 
without the need for protracted trials requiring significant investment of 
resources.” Id. (quoting Rep. Deborah Pryce, who supported the Civil Rights 
Tax Relief Act). 
272 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003). 
273 Id.; Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 55 
P.3d 1208, 1217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that forcing plaintiffs to pay 
the negative tax consequences will “thwart” meritorious claims from coming 
forward); see supra Part III (discussing the disincentives to bringing lawsuits 
for sexual harassment). 
274 § 104(a); see supra Part II.C, D (discussing the taxation of damage 
and attorneys’ fee awards in non-physical injury cases). 
275 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2003). 
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. 
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual 
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plaintiffs for negative tax burdens will increase financial 
consequences on employers, which in turn will encourage 
employers to avoid liability by implementing preventative 
programs and taking strong positions against sexual 
harassment.276 Therefore, this solution furthers the goal of Title 
VII to eliminate discrimination in society.277 In addition, by 
maintaining the taxation of employment discrimination damage 
and settlement awards, the government will still receive the 
revenue it gained by implementing § 104(a)(2) in the first 
place.278 Only this time, the government will receive its tax 
revenue from the blameworthy parties, not the victims.279 
CONCLUSION 
The federal government has a legitimate and important goal 
of eliminating the evils of sexual harassment and sex 
discrimination from society. Through the Civil Rights Acts of 
1964 and 1991, Congress attempted to discourage sexual 
harassment and compensate victims for the considerable harms 
they may suffer by allowing them to sue for relief under Title 
                                                          
harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, 
expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, 
informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue 
of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all 
concerned. 
 Id. 
276 Id. “Congress prescribed a strong medicine, the anti-employment 
discrimination laws, to cure the social malady of invidious discrimination. 
Deterrence is accomplished by placing an economic price on discriminatory 
acts, and stigmatizing the wrongdoer’s acts before the entire community.” 
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1994). 
277 See supra Part I.A (discussing the function of Title VII and the EEOC 
in eliminating sex discrimination in employment). 
278 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003); see supra note 
137 (describing the taxation of non-physical injuries as a means of raising 
revenue). 
279 See supra Part III (discussing the negative effects imposed by taxing 
the victims of sexual harassment). 
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VII.280 Only five years after providing victims of harassment with 
a variety of compensatory damages to recover in lawsuits, 
Congress contradicted itself by taxing employment discrimination 
victims through § 104(a)(2).281 It is already socially undesirable 
to bring allegations against those guilty of sexual harassment, and 
now the government has made it financially undesirable by 
requiring attorneys’ fees and compensatory damage awards based 
on non-physical injuries to be subject to income taxation.282 In 
doing so, victims are subject to double discrimination and are 
told that their injuries are not “real.” Until Congress passes a law 
requiring those liable for sexual harassment to pay plaintiffs for 
tax consequences created by § 104(a)(2), the government will be 
using the tax code to perpetuate the damaging practice of sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment throughout society. 
 
                                                          
280 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003). 
281 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003). 
282 See supra text accompanying note 208-09 (discussing the undesirability 
of bringing lawsuits under Title VII for sexual harassment due to the negative 
financial consequences posed by Section 104(a)(2)). 
